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BESPOKE BANKRUPTCY 
Laura N. Coordes* 
Abstract 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is the primary source of bankruptcy relief 
for debtors in the United States. But it is not the only source. Over the 
years, Congress has occasionally created bespoke bankruptcy—
customized debt relief designed for a particular group of debtors. 
Bespoke bankruptcy may provide desperately needed bankruptcy relief 
to entities that are ineligible or otherwise unable to access bankruptcy 
through the Bankruptcy Code. But bespoke bankruptcy is also fraught 
with difficulties. To what extent should bespoke bankruptcy be used or 
developed instead of the Bankruptcy Code? 
This Article takes up this question. It begins by acknowledging the 
limitations of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighting instances where 
Code-based bankruptcy relief does not work. It then introduces the 
concept of bespoke bankruptcy and devises a framework that 
policymakers can use to decide when and how to implement it. In so 
doing, this Article sets the stage for a new direction in bankruptcy law: 
one where bespoke bankruptcy performs a limited, but critical, role in 
providing relief to entities that the Bankruptcy Code either does not or 
cannot assist. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2016, Puerto Rico found itself on a financial precipice. 
Years of overborrowing and other poor economic decisions,1 spurred in 
part by mainland U.S. policies,2 had saddled the island with “layers of 
debt.”3 In April of 2016, then-Governor Alejandro García Padilla signed 
an emergency moratorium just before the island defaulted on a $422 
million bond payment, while warning that Puerto Rico would also default 
on an upcoming July 1 bond payment of $800 million.4 These defaults 
threatened to “trigger a cycle of hospital closures, electric-grid instability, 
infrastructur[e] collapse, and emergency-service breakdowns.”5 In other 
words, Puerto Rico’s financial distress was at risk of morphing into a 
humanitarian disaster. 
Unfortunately, Puerto Rico had no way to address its mounting 
problems. The government lacked the money to repay the bonds.6 Rating 
agencies downgraded the island’s credit ratings to junk, impeding its 
ability to borrow additional funds.7 In June of 2016, the U.S. Supreme 
 
 1. See Jim Wyss & Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico’s Comeback Was Nigh, but Then the 
Coronavirus Came, BLOOMBERG L. (June 12, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
bankruptcy-law/puerto-ricos-comeback-was-nigh-but-then-the-coronavirus-came (“For years the 
commonwealth sold debt to paper over budget gaps.”). 
 2. See Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1673 
(2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Congress repealed Puerto Rico’s favorable tax credits, and 
manufacturing growth deflated, precipitating a prolonged recession.”). 
 3. John A. E. Pottow, What Bankruptcy Law Can and Cannot Do for Puerto Rico, 85 
REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE P.R. 689, 701 (2016). 
 4. Ed Morales, Who is Responsible for Puerto Rico’s Debt?, NATION (June 7, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/who-is-responsible-for-puerto-ricos-debt/. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 140 S. Ct. at 1673 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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Court confirmed that neither Puerto Rico nor its municipalities8 were 
eligible for bankruptcy relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, while 
striking down Puerto Rico’s attempt to create its own bankruptcy law.9 
Even if Puerto Rico had been eligible to file for bankruptcy, the 
Bankruptcy Code does not have a procedure designed to restructure or 
adjust the debts of a U.S. territory, meaning that, at best, Puerto Rico 
would have only had access to partial relief.10 
On June 30, 2016, the day before Puerto Rico was set to default on the 
$800 million bond payment, Congress stepped in, passing the Puerto Rico 
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA).11 
PROMESA provided a form of bankruptcy relief designed specifically 
for Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities.12 When President Barack 
Obama signed the Act into law, he claimed it would provide “more 
stability, better services and greater prosperity over the long term for the 
people of Puerto Rico.”13 Though even its supporters acknowledged that 
the law was far from perfect, there was a clear sense of hope that this new 
law—a combination of traditional bankruptcy relief and other debt 
restructuring mechanisms—would provide Puerto Rico with a fresh start 
and a functioning economy.14 
PROMESA is a prominent example of what this Article calls 
“bespoke bankruptcy”—customized debt relief designed for a particular 
group of debtors (in this case, Puerto Rico and its municipalities). 
PROMESA combines portions of the Bankruptcy Code with other debt 
restructuring tools, namely a financial oversight board and collective 
 
 8. This Article also refers to Puerto Rico’s municipalities as “instrumentalities,” which 
tracks the language used in PROMESA. 48 U.S.C. § 2104(19)(A). For a discussion of the case 
law addressing what constitutes a municipality eligible for relief under Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, see Matthew Adam Bruckner, Special Purpose Municipal Entities and 
Bankruptcy: The Case of Public Colleges, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341, 353–68 (2020). 
 9. See Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942, 1947 (2016). 
 10. See Pottow, supra note 3, at 700 (noting that Puerto Rico’s substantial, unsustainable 
territorial debt would have been exempt under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 11. Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241). 
 12. See Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, 
NBC NEWS (June 30, 2016, 1:39 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-how-
promesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741 [https://perma.cc/HW4T-3CZB]. Although 
PROMESA was designed in response to Puerto Rico’s difficulties, by its terms it applies to other 
territories as well. See 48 U.S.C. § 2104(20)(A)–(E).  
 13. Guadalupe, supra note 12. 
 14. See Ben Norton, Critics Say Bipartisan Bill Signed by Obama Imposes “Colonial” 
Control Board on Puerto Rico, Puts “Hedge Funds Ahead of People,” SALON (July 1, 2016, 11:45 
PM), https://www.salon.com/2016/07/01/critics_say_bipartisan_bill_signed_by_obama_imposes 
_colonial_control_board_on_puerto_rico_puts_hedge_funds_ahead_of_people/ [https://perma. 
cc/Z3MQ-2K6N] (“Some Democrats have admitted that they think the bill is bad, but argued it 
must be passed as it is the only way for Puerto Rico to be able to restructure its debts and avoid 
expensive legal fees when creditors take it to court.”). 
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action provisions for bond modification.15 Although PROMESA 
effectively provides a traditional bankruptcy procedure for the territory 
and its instrumentalities through Title III of the Act, it also equips these 
entities with tools and techniques drawn from sovereign debt 
restructuring and out-of-court municipal finance practices to create a 
form of relief that Congress hoped would be better suited to Puerto Rico’s 
needs than anything in the Bankruptcy Code itself.16 
Although the term “bespoke bankruptcy” is new, Congress has 
designed bespoke relief before. Prior to PROMESA, Congress passed the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank),17 which combines financial regulation with a federal, orderly 
liquidation mechanism for certain financial firms.18 Today, in light of the 
economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, lawmakers and scholars 
are questioning whether additional reforms are needed to make 
bankruptcy a better tool for the entities it is designed to serve.19 
As PROMESA illustrates, bespoke bankruptcy creates both new 
challenges and new opportunities. Because PROMESA is new and 
different from the Bankruptcy Code, its implementation has faced 
setbacks that are rarely, if ever, seen in Code-based bankruptcy practice.20 
Puerto Rico’s economic future is still uncertain today, four years after 
PROMESA’s passage, and this uncertainty predated the recent economic 
fallout due to the COVID-19 pandemic.21 Creditors, bondholders, the 
 
 15. Section II.A.2.b of this Article offers a fuller discussion of PROMESA. 
 16. See infra notes 180–182 and accompanying text. 
 17. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.). 
 18. See David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People, Places, or 
Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2225 (2014) (“With the new Dodd-Frank framework 
and other administrative resolution rules, we are clearly in the realm of bankruptcy.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Henes, Viewpoint: Congress Should Codify the One-Day 
Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/viewpoint-
congress-should-codify-the-one-day-bankruptcy-11589191200?shareToken=stb6c89d2d839142 
7c91621fc250b12470 [https://perma.cc/MGL8-MP3F] (proposing that Congress codify a process 
that would allow companies to use the Bankruptcy Code to confirm a one-day bankruptcy plan, 
particularly in light of the burdens the economic fallout from COVID-19 is expected to place on 
the bankruptcy courts); Gert-Jan Boon, Amending Insolvency Legislation in Response to the 
COVID-19 Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. BANKR. ROUNDTABLE (May 12, 2020), https://blogs.harvard 
.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2020/05/12/amending-insolvency-legislation-in-response-to-the-
covid-19-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/89TV-PUP9] (“Insolvency legislation which is effective under 
normal market conditions may prove insufficient or ineffective in the current situation.”).  
 20. For example, the litigation surrounding the constitutionality of the oversight board’s 
appointment, discussed in Section III.A, raises issues about the legitimacy of the board’s actions 
that are not present in typical bankruptcy cases, which do not involve the imposition of an 
oversight board. 
 21. See Danica Coto, Puerto Rico’s Economy in Limbo as Governor Rejects Debt Deal, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2020), https://apnews.com/dd85b43cad66dec9026c4dd07df9287f 
[https://perma.cc/28FV-UX74]. 
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local government, and the Puerto Rican people have all challenged the 
oversight board and the scope of its authority to oversee the island’s 
finances.22 The Puerto Rican government has wavered in its cooperation 
with the board, at times supporting its debt restructuring efforts,23 and at 
times appearing to undermine them.24 And the district judge overseeing 
the court proceedings associated with the debt restructuring process has 
had to interpret and apply a law that is new and unprecedented in many 
respects.25 
Yet, Puerto Rico’s experience also shows that sometimes the 
Bankruptcy Code is not an appropriate mechanism to provide bankruptcy 
relief. Indeed, the alternative to PROMESA, amending the Bankruptcy 
Code to make Puerto Rico eligible for traditional bankruptcy, would have 
been both politically and substantively difficult.26 Puerto Rico is thus an 
example of a bankruptcy misfit: it needed bankruptcy, but the relief the 
Bankruptcy Code provided was not appropriate for it.27 Through 
PROMESA, Congress sought to achieve the same outcome for Puerto 
Rico as sought by debtors that use the Bankruptcy Code—a fresh start—
but did so through very different means. 
Puerto Rico is not alone in being a bankruptcy misfit. Other entities 
are either ineligible for relief under the Bankruptcy Code28 or struggle to 
 
 22. These challenges have continued to the present day. See Dánica Coto, Board Submits 
Puerto Rico Budget as Some Question Its Powers, WASH. TIMES (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jun/11/board-submits-puerto-rico-budget-as-
some-question-/ [perma.cc/7HK6-MUDS] (discussing congressional debates over the extent of 
the oversight board’s authority). 
 23. See Robert Slavin, Puerto Rico Governor Makes FAFAA Head Her Liaison to Oversight 
Board, BOND BUYER (Mar. 10, 2020, 11:44 AM), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/puerto-rico-
governor-makes-fafaa-head-her-liaison-to-the-oversight-board [https://perma.cc/BC7R-ZW77] 
(describing the governor’s wish that the government’s relationship with the oversight board be 
“one of respect and openness”). 
 24. See Giovanna Garofalo, Puerto Rico Gov’t and Oversight Board Debate Over Approval 
on Debt Deals, WKLY. J. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.theweeklyjournal.com/politics/puerto-rico-
gov-t-and-oversight-board-debate-over-approval-on-debt-deals/article_ff112d76-4d12-11ea-b1a 
7-d7c71544db03.html [https://perma.cc/N6N8-MULA] (describing the governor’s rejection of 
the board’s agreement with bondholders to reduce Puerto Rico’s debt by 70%). 
 25. See Jenna Greene, Proskauer Pair Win Watershed Decision in $125B Puerto Rico 
Bankruptcy, AM. LAW. LITIG. DAILY (Jan. 10, 2020), https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets. 
production.proskauer/uploads/961bf19743cfc6debca1b99583eea3cb.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6W 
3-77S6] (“These are unprecedented cases . . . .”). 
 26. See Melika Hadžiomerović, Note, An Arbitral Solution: A Private Law Alternative to 
Bankruptcy for Puerto Rico, Territories, and Sovereign Nations, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1263, 
1277 (2017) (arguing that PROMESA was “one of the only plausible courses of action available 
at the time because the political climate did not allow for a Code amendment”). 
 27. Cf.  Laura N. Coordes, Reorganizing Healthcare Bankruptcy, 61 B.C. L. REV. 419, 432–
33 (2020) (discussing the concept of bankruptcy misfits in the healthcare context). 
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use the Bankruptcy Code even if they are eligible.29 In years to come, 
Congress may well find it desirable to implement bespoke bankruptcy for 
other debtor groups. The Bankruptcy Code is now over forty years old,30 
and the world today is markedly different from the one in which the Code 
was drafted. Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have all expressed 
concerns that the Bankruptcy Code no longer works as intended in many 
ways, even for many of the debtors it was designed to serve in the first 
place.31 But to what extent should bankruptcy law become more bespoke? 
This Article maintains that bespoke bankruptcy should be used 
sparingly but argues that it does have potential beyond its limited uses to 
date. To make this case, Part I begins by defining and exploring the 
limitations of “Code-based bankruptcy”: bankruptcy law that comes from 
the Bankruptcy Code itself. The Bankruptcy Code is designed to be broad 
in scope, accommodating a wide variety of entities. To accomplish this 
goal efficiently, the Bankruptcy Code provides standard templates that 
most entities can use to attain financial relief. These templates are based 
on processes that work for the debtors that use the Bankruptcy Code most 
often: businesses and consumers. 
These standard templates may work well in many cases. However, as 
Part II illustrates, some debtors are so differently situated from the 
debtors the Code was designed to accommodate that Code-based 
bankruptcy fails to provide them with adequate debt relief. Part II 
catalogues the various ways that Congress has adjusted bankruptcy law 
for these debtors, including through the creation of bespoke bankruptcy. 
This Article then turns to the future of bankruptcy law, explaining that, 
while most major debates about bankruptcy’s future focus on further 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, bespoke bankruptcy is an option 
worthy of consideration. 
Part III then explores bespoke bankruptcy’s possible contributions to 
bankruptcy law. The costs of bespoke bankruptcy are high in terms of 
 
 29. See, e.g., Coordes, supra note 27, at 432–33 (discussing healthcare businesses). 
 30. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C.) (enacting Title 11 of the United States Code as the “Bankruptcy Code”). 
 31. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Foreword, Bankruptcy’s New and 
Old Frontiers, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1571, 1572 (2018) (“Today’s typical Chapter 11 case looks 
radically different than did the typical case in the Code’s early years.”); Charles J. Tabb, What’s 
Wrong with Chapter 11?, at 9 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of L. Legal Studies Research Paper, Paper No. 
19-15, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3352137 [https://perma.cc/ 
FPD4-6FWE] (critiquing modern Chapter 11 practice); COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF 
CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2014) (offering 
proposals for updating the Bankruptcy Code). Senator Elizabeth Warren also recently released a 
proposed overhaul of the consumer bankruptcy system. See Tucker Higgins, Elizabeth Warren 
Unveils Plan to Overhaul Bankruptcy Laws, Spotlighting Differences with Biden, CNBC (Jan. 
7, 2020, 9:37 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/07/elizabeth-warren-unveils-bankruptcy-
agenda-targeting-joe-biden.html [https://perma.cc/7FJM-YSGS]. 
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both design and implementation, which suggests that bespoke bankruptcy 
should not be widespread. Yet, bespoke bankruptcy can also provide 
distinct benefits in the form of debt relief where none is otherwise 
available. Part III thus turns to the question of when it is worthwhile for 
Congress to engage in the process of designing specialized legislation. To 
answer this question, Part III provides an eligibility test and four factors 
to assess the need for bespoke relief. The eligibility test focuses on 
viability, assessing the societal need for a particular entity due to the 
public importance of the goods or services it provides. Entities that are 
deemed too important to fail—and only these entities—should be 
considered eligible for bespoke relief. Once entities have been identified 
through the eligibility test, policymakers should weigh four factors to 
determine whether bespoke relief is warranted: (1) how many of these 
entities exist (numerosity); (2) how similar they are to each other 
(similarity); (3) how well Code-based relief works or should work for 
them (mismatch); and (4) the entities’ vulnerability to systemic risk and 
exogenous shocks (vulnerability). 
After articulating these steps, Part III provides an example of how to 
apply them and, in doing so, illustrates that other subsovereigns—namely 
states and municipalities—may benefit from bespoke relief. This Article 
concludes by identifying further areas of research into bespoke 
bankruptcy’s theory and application. 
I.  CODE-BASED BANKRUPTCY: THE STANDARD TEMPLATE 
To understand bespoke bankruptcy, it is first necessary to understand 
the primary source of U.S. bankruptcy law: the Bankruptcy Code. This 
Article uses the term “Code-based bankruptcy” to distinguish relief 
provided by the Bankruptcy Code from bespoke bankruptcy relief. This 
Part first discusses core characteristics of all bankruptcy law (i.e., 
bespoke and Code-based) before turning to a discussion of Code-based 
bankruptcy and its limitations. 
A.  Bankruptcy’s Core Characteristics 
There is substantial debate over the purposes and procedures that 
characterize U.S. bankruptcy law. For purposes of this Article, however, 
“bankruptcy,” at its most basic, can be characterized using three 
elements. 
First, bankruptcy is a federal remedy that allows the debtor to impair 
contracts and restructure its obligations.32 The Contract Clause of the 
 
 32. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of 
Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 612–13 (2008) (discussing Congress’s power under the 
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Constitution prohibits states from impairing contracts; the Bankruptcy 
Clause grants this power to the federal government instead.33 Thus, 
“bankruptcy law” in the United States refers to federal, not state law.  
Second, bankruptcy is a collective34 and compulsory process that 
adjusts the relationship among a debtor and its creditors by resolving 
competing creditors’ claims to limited assets.35 In this respect, 
bankruptcy plays an important procedural role in centralizing both legal 
conflict and asset distribution.36 Bankruptcy is a compulsory process: 
once a bankruptcy case is filed, parties cannot “opt[] to sit out” in the 
hope of something better.37 In order to reach an orderly resolution of 
creditors’ claims, bankruptcy provides a defined priority scheme that 
allows parties to understand where they rank in relation to each other in 
their claims to the debtor’s property.38 These claims are sorted out in 
bankruptcy court.  
 
CHI. L. REV. 775, 790 (1987) (“Bankruptcy is simply a federal scheme designed to distribute the 
costs among those at risk.”). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have 
Power . . . To establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States . . . .”); see also James L. Tatum III, To Disappear a City, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 105, 109 
(2019) (“The Constitution’s Contract Clause impedes the ability of states and municipalities to 
impair contracts.”). 
 34. See Skeel, supra note 18, at 2223 (observing that bankruptcy “is collective in nature”). 
 35. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (2013) (summarizing the creditors’ bargain theory of bankruptcy, 
which focuses on creditor competition for limited assets); Alan Schwartz, Essay, A Contract 
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1807 (1998) (“Business 
bankruptcy systems attempt to solve a coordination problem for the creditors of insolvent firms.”); 
but see Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of 
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2013) (pushing back on the idea that 
corporate bankruptcy is a mandatory regime when investors can partition asssets into different 
legal entities, thus creating a regime that allows a limited number of investors to effectively opt 
out of the bankruptcy process). 
 36. See Warren, supra note 32, at 793 (“A process such as bankruptcy [is] designed to 
consider the rights of more than two parties and to distribute the losses occasioned by the debtor’s 
failure . . . .”); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply 
to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 824 (1987) (“[B]ankruptcy law is a procedure in which the 
actions of those with rights to the assets of a firm are stayed and the affairs of the firm are sorted 
out in an orderly way.”). 
 37. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy, 38 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1301, 1302 (2017) (“[T]he regime is compulsory, meaning that on a showing of the debtor’s 
insolvency no claimant to the contested assets can unilaterally prevent the bankruptcy process 
from taking its course or do better by opting to sit out.”). 
 38. See id. at 1306 (asserting that “defined rights to a debtor’s assets” is a theme of 
bankruptcy law). 
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Third, bankruptcy provides breathing space to enable value 
maximization.39 The debtor uses this breathing space to assess whether it 
is viable as a going concern or whether value maximization (for a debtor’s 
stakeholders)40 would instead occur through a liquidation.41 Depending 
on the outcome of this assessment, bankruptcy serves one of two 
purposes. If a debtor can continue as a going concern, bankruptcy is 
rehabilitative in nature, providing a fresh start and a discharge of debts to 
the debtor.42 In contrast, if the debtor does not continue as a going 
concern, bankruptcy provides an orderly process for value-maximizing 
liquidation.43  
At its most basic, then, bankruptcy can be described as a coordinated 
federal process that provides for breathing space to enable value 
maximization.44 This indicates that entities benefit from bankruptcy when 
they have dispersed legal conflicts, need breathing space to enable value-
maximizing decisions, or need federal law’s power to break contracts. 
Although the Bankruptcy Code provides mechanisms through which 
debtors can take advantage of bankruptcy relief, the Code is not the 
exclusive means through which an entity can achieve bankruptcy relief.45 
Thus, the concept of “bankruptcy” is broader than the mechanisms 
contained within the Bankruptcy Code.46 
  
 
 39. See Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility 
Rules, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1212 (2017) (discussing how Chapter 9 bankruptcy provides 
breathing space and the ability to overcome holdouts and modify agreements on a nonconsensual 
basis). 
 40. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
795, 821 & n.94 (2004) (citing literature that illustrates agreement among scholars on the 
bankruptcy goal of “the maximization of distributions to beneficiaries”). 
 41. See Matthew Adam Bruckner, Higher Ed “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders, 106 KY. L.J. 
223, 241–42 (2017) (noting that bankruptcy reorganization is appropriate when it enhances value 
for the parties). 
 42. See Tatum, supra note 33, at 114 (2019) (discussing how the rehabilitative objectives of 
Chapters 9 and 11 are responses to financial, rather than economic, distress); ELIZABETH WARREN 
ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 343 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing the importance of 
discharge and how it “is the exclusive province of federal bankruptcy law”). 
 43. See Tatum, supra note 33, at 115 (noting that Chapter 7 is the Code’s response to 
companies experiencing economic distress). 
 44. Professor David Skeel provides a similar description of bankruptcy’s core attributes. 
See Skeel, supra note 18, at 2222–23 (describing bankruptcy as (1) enabling a debtor to restructure 
obligations; (2) imposed or facilitated by government or another third party; (3) collective; and 
(4) specific to a particular entity or individual). 
 45. See id. at 2223–24.  
 46. Id. at 2225; see also Andrew B. Dawson, Better Than Bankruptcy?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. 
REV. 137, 145 (2016) (discussing assignments for the benefit of creditors). 
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B.  Code-Based Bankruptcy and Its Limitations 
In the United States, the Bankruptcy Code is the primary source of 
bankruptcy law.47 To better understand the purposes and aims of the 
Bankruptcy Code, it is helpful to examine the Code’s structure and 
history, as well as the legal scholarship surrounding Code-based 
bankruptcy law. 
The Bankruptcy Code primarily centers around two types of entities: 
businesses and consumers. The bulk of the Bankruptcy Code, and the 
Code’s most frequently used provisions, are created for (and used by) 
these two entity types.48 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code provides multiple 
avenues for both businesses and consumers to file for bankruptcy. A 
business can liquidate under Chapter 7 or reorganize under Chapter 11.49 
An individual may liquidate assets under Chapter 7 or reorganize debts 
under either Chapters 11 or 13.50 Both individuals and businesses can 
initiate cross-border proceedings using Chapter 15.51 
The history of U.S. bankruptcy law also illustrates U.S. bankruptcy’s 
business and consumer focus. Early federal bankruptcy laws in the United 
States focused on addressing the debts of merchants and individuals.52 
When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, it made bankruptcy 
more attractive to both individuals and businesses.53 As a result, both 
types of entities use the Code extensively. For businesses, corporate 
bankruptcy has become “a business and strategic decision rather than a 
last resort.”54 For individuals, estimates suggest that about 10% of the 
 
 47. See Comment, Bankruptcy—Security Interests in Principal Residences: Chapter 13 
Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims—a Potential Crack Down on Cramdowns, 69 N.D. L. REV. 
241, 243 (1993). 
 48. See Overview of Bankruptcy Chapters, U.S. DEP’T. JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/ 
bankruptcy-fact-sheets/overview-bankruptcy-chapters [https://perma.cc/A8CJ-6CDW] (over-
viewing the Code’s “principal chapters,” and noting that Chapter 7 “is a liquidation proceeding 
available to consumers and businesses,” Chapter 11 “provides a procedure by which an individual 
or a business can reorganize its debts,” Chapter 12 “allows a family farmer or a fisherman to file 
for bankruptcy,” and Chapter 13 “is used primarily by individual consumers”). 
 49. See What Is the US Bankruptcy Code?, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinance 
institute.com/resources/knowledge/other/us-bankruptcy-code/ [https://perma.cc/P6VC-EAX6]. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See David Haynes, History of Bankruptcy in the United States, BALANCE (Feb. 13, 
2020), https://www.thebalance.com/history-of-bankruptcy-in-the-united-states-316225 [https:// 
perma.cc/U88K-V78Q].  
 53. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2016, 2021 (2003) (reviewing DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY 
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001)). 
 54. Id. 
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current U.S. population—some 36 million individuals—have filed for 
bankruptcy.55 
Existing legal scholarship also tends to focus predominantly on 
business and consumer debtors. For example, much ink has been spilled 
over the proper purpose of corporate bankruptcy law, with scholars such 
as Professor Douglas Baird and Professor Thomas Jackson taking the 
position that it should reflect, or vindicate, the deal creditors would strike 
if they had the chance to bargain ex ante,56 and those such as Senator 
Elizabeth Warren and Professor Jay Westbrook arguing that corporate 
bankruptcy can serve public interests and other stakeholders, such as 
employees, in addition to creditors.57 Over time, other scholars have 
expanded, developed, and commented upon the work of these 
foundational theorists, creating a rich and nuanced discussion of the role 
and purposes of corporate bankruptcy.58 
On the consumer bankruptcy side, there is a similarly rich literature 
that seeks to develop and understand the purposes and aims of consumer 
bankruptcy law.59 Much of the consumer literature also focuses on 
 
 55. Bob Lawless, How Many People Have Filed Bankruptcy?, CREDIT SLIPS (June 22, 2020, 
8:09 PM), creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/06/how-many-people-have-filed-bankruptcy.html 
[https://perma.cc/HD3W-LVUB]. 
 56. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the 
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 100 (1984); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, 
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982) (“A more 
profitable line of pursuit might be to view bankruptcy as a system designed to mirror the 
agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate 
such an agreement from an ex ante position.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 32, at 777 (“I see bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with 
a debtor’s multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number of different 
actors.”); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses 
in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 500–01 (1999) (discussing “propositions that can be 
stated as a matter of conventional wisdom” and noting, inter alia, that “Congress embraced 
reorganization with an explicit concern toward saving jobs”); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Commercial Law and the Public Interest, 4 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFS. 445, 451 (2015) (noting 
“the lack of apparent concern with a public interest” in the scholarly literature). 
 58. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose 
of Corporate Bankruptcy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709, 1721–27 (2020) (advancing a theory of 
corporate bankruptcy where the goal is to resolve an incomplete contracting problem that occurs 
due to the uncertainty that characterizes financial distress); Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate 
Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1717 (2018) (developing a model of corporate 
bankruptcy as a public-private partnership); Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: 
Corporate Reorganization After Jevic, 93 WASH. L. REV. 631, 631 (2018) (downplaying the 
importance of efficiency in corporate bankruptcy). 
 59. See Pamela Foohey, New Article from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project: Attorneys’ 
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chapter choice, asking when consumers should use Chapter 7 
(liquidation) as opposed to Chapter 13 (individual debt reorganization).60 
The Bankruptcy Code, and the commentary surrounding it, is thus 
primarily focused on how best to provide relief to businesses and 
consumers. A consequence of this focus is Congress’s heavy reliance on 
previously established business and consumer templates when asked to 
modify the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate debtors that do not neatly 
fit the business and consumer molds. For example, as Congress 
developed Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code to address municipal debt 
restructuring, it borrowed from Chapter 11—the chapter designed 
primarily for business reorganizations61—even though municipalities are 
substantially different from businesses in both form and function.62 
Similarly, when Congress created Chapter 12 for family farmers and 
family fishermen, it used portions of both Chapters 11 (business 
reorganizations) and 13 (individual debtors), although the way these 
borrowed provisions work in Chapter 12 is substantially different from 
the contexts of Chapters 11 and 13.63 
At bottom, the Bankruptcy Code is a series of widely applicable, 
standardized processes that many entities can use to attain debt relief. 
There is a core set of common ideas and procedures, which is shared 
among most or all chapters.64 These ideas and procedures have been 
battle-tested and refined through decades of jurisprudence. Although the 
Code does contain some flexibility to accommodate nonbusiness, 
nonconsumer debtors, it ultimately relies on this set of standard 
templates, which are designed primarily for businesses and consumers.65 
Such standard templates, with their embedded rules and norms, are a key 
 
creditslips%2Ffeed+%28Credit+Slips%29 [https://perma.cc/JJ2D-Q68U] (discussing the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, “a long-term research project studying people who file chapter 7 
and 13 bankruptcy”). 
 60. Pamela Foohey et al., Attorneys’ Fees and Chapter Choice, 36 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 20, 
20 (2017) (“One of the most important choices that individuals considering bankruptcy face is 
whether to file for chapter 7 or 13.”). 
 61. See Tatum, supra note 33, at 110 (observing that each time that Congress has amended 
Chapter 9, it has become more like Chapter 11). 
 62. See Laura Napoli Coordes, Restructuring Municipal Bankruptcy, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 
307, 315 (2016) (discussing the difficulty of using Chapter 11 rules to address a municipality’s 
“vastly different” problems). 
 63. LISA P. SUMNER, COMPARISON: CHAPTER 11 VS CHAPTER 12 VS CHAPTER 13, at 1 (2018), 
https://www.nexsenpruet.com/uploads/1498/doc/Comparison_Chapter_11_vs_Chapter_12_vs_
Chapter_13_(w-009-8719).pdf [https://perma.cc/75YZ-GS74] (“Chapter 12 incorporates many of 
the same provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as do Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 but with significant 
operative differences.”). 
 64. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 547 (preferences); 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay). 
 65. See What Is the US Bankruptcy Code?, supra note 49 (noting that the Code “governs 
the procedures that businesses and individuals must follow when filing for bankruptcy” (emphasis 
added)). 
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benefit of a statutory scheme like the Bankruptcy Code.66 And for most 
entities, the Code’s standard templates work well most of the time.67 
However, not all entities are alike. Different means may be required 
for different entities to achieve the same desired bankruptcy outcomes.68 
To some extent, the Bankruptcy Code takes these differences into 
account. For example, value maximization may play less of a role in 
municipal bankruptcies, where the debtor at issue—a municipality—
must continue as a going concern due to the importance of the public 
services it provides, even if it might make financial sense for that debtor 
to sell off its assets and “liquidate.”69 Congress responded to this concern 
by creating a separate Code chapter for municipalities.70  
With regards to municipal bankruptcies, some scholars believe that 
Congress did not go far enough.71 Indeed, bankruptcy theory might be 
very different for debtors such as municipalities.72 For example, 
Professor Vincent Buccola has proposed a new theory for municipal 
bankruptcy, one where the goal is to preserve “spatial economies when 
 
 66. See Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial 
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing how statutes create 
“clear, one-size-fits-all rules”). 
 67. Indeed, even in a bespoke bankruptcy system like this Article discusses further below, 
it makes good sense to retain many of the hallmarks of the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of 
efficiency and reliability. For example, PROMESA retained many aspects of the Code’s standard 
templates, while adding some features and modifying others. See David Skeel, Reflections on Two 
Years of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., 87 REVISTA JURÍDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE P.R. 862, 864 (2018). 
 68. For an insightful account and analysis of U.S. business insolvency systems outside of 
the Bankruptcy Code, see generally STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, THE LAW OF FAILURE: A TOUR THROUGH 
THE WILDS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS INSOLVENCY LAW (2018). 
 69. See Laura N. Coordes, Formalizing Chapter 9’s Experts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1257 
(2018) (“In chapter 9, no liquidation alternative exists.”). 
 70. See Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Divide: Federalism Concerns in Municipal 
Insolvency, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 40 (2017). 
 71. See, e.g., Coordes, supra note 69, at 1257 (describing the difficulty of applying plan 
confirmation standards in a Chapter 9 case); Dawson, supra note 70, at 35 (advocating for a 
functional approach to municipal bankruptcy that recognizes debt-governance overlap); Clayton 
P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1206 (2016) (discussing a need for Chapter 9 to address 
governance issues); Coordes, supra note 62, at 310 (arguing that the Chapter 9 framework is a 
“poor fit” for municipalities); Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of 
Financially Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1384 (2014) (advocating for increased 
authority for state-run takeover boards); Buccola, supra note 37, at 1301 (arguing that, due to 
uncertainty about priorities in Chapter 9 and to the ability of multiple actors to veto the bankruptcy 
process in the municipal context, traditional bankruptcy models do not adequately explain 
municipal debt adjustment). 
 72. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2012) (proposing a theory of bankruptcy as the “‘armistice line’ 
between competing interest groups” and arguing that bankruptcy is an “expression of 
distributional norms and interest group politics,” not an exercise in economic efficiency). 
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public debt otherwise threatens to dissipate them.”73 Viewed in this light, 
municipal bankruptcy is not about value maximization but rather survival 
and preservation. However, the literature on municipal bankruptcy theory 
remains sparse and, more generally, bankruptcy outside of the business 
and consumer contexts is largely undertheorized.74  
II.  THE BANKRUPTCY MISFIT PROBLEM 
To some extent, Congress has already begun to recognize that the 
Bankruptcy Code’s standard templates do not always work well for some 
of the entities that need bankruptcy relief. For example, as previously 
discussed, a key characteristic of bankruptcy is its federal nature. 
Municipalities, potential debtors in this federal system, are creatures of 
the state in which they are located.75 When a municipality seeks to file 
for bankruptcy, there is always a concern that the federal bankruptcy 
process will interfere with the state’s right to govern its municipalities.76 
To address this problem, the Bankruptcy Code allows the municipality to 
access the federal bankruptcy system only upon the consent of the state 
and only for the limited purpose of debt adjustment.77 
However, the Bankruptcy Code does not account for all differences 
among debtors. Sometimes, debtors’ differences can give rise to a 
“bankruptcy misfit” problem: some debtors require such different 
mechanisms that using the Bankruptcy Code becomes difficult, 
impractical, or even impossible, thereby leaving these debtors unable to 
obtain bankruptcy relief.78 These bankruptcy misfits are a natural 
consequence of the Bankruptcy Code since it groups together debtors 
under chapters for efficiency and ease of administration.79 Bankruptcy 
 
 73. Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 817, 821 (2019). 
 74. A marked exception to this is an article by Professor Skeel, who seeks to develop a 
comprehensive theory of when bankruptcy is necessary. Skeel, supra note 18, at 2230–31 
(proposing a five-factor framework to determine when bankruptcy should be available to a 
particular entity). 
 75. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 345–46 (“Unlike a business, a municipality is never truly 
a discrete entity—it is always a creature of the state and/or federal government.”). 
 76. See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 530–31 (1936) 
(articulating this concern). 
 77. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (providing that a state must specifically authorize a 
municipality to file for Chapter 9); 11 U.S.C. § 903 (providing that states retain control over a 
municipality’s “political or governmental powers”). 
 78. Coordes, supra note 27, at 423. 
 79. Although the Bankruptcy Code does provide courts some flexibility to tailor the process 
to debtors’ needs through § 105(a), the provision widely thought to give bankruptcy courts equity 
powers, it is far from clear that the equity powers of the bankruptcy courts can be used to 
accommodate many bankruptcy misfits. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has recently held that a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers cannot be used to contravene the 
Code’s statutory provisions. Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014). 
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misfits are the exception to the rule that the Code’s chapters mostly work 
for most debtors. 
Before delving more deeply into the bankruptcy misfit problem, it is 
important to recognize at the outset that not all bankruptcy misfits need 
bankruptcy law. If nonbankruptcy techniques are better suited to 
resolving an entity’s financial distress, excluding that entity from 
bankruptcy does not pose a problem. For example, the federal 
government has typically stepped in with bailout funds for struggling 
insurance companies, and many of these entities are prohibited from 
filing for bankruptcy under the Code.80 In other cases, there are salient 
political, practical, and legal considerations that may outweigh a 
particular entity’s need or desire for federal bankruptcy relief.81 This 
Article’s proposed framework is designed to help assess these 
considerations against the entity’s need for bankruptcy,82 doing for 
bankruptcy law what other scholars have done in the bailout context for 
decades.83   
On the other hand, some bankruptcy misfits do exhibit a need for 
bankruptcy and are not accommodated by the Bankruptcy Code. There is 
a “default assumption” among scholars and policymakers that bankruptcy 
relief should be widely available to those that need it.84 And although 
some bankruptcy misfits exhibit a demonstrated need for bankruptcy 
relief, use of the Bankruptcy Code creates significant problems that may 
outweigh any practical benefits of the bankruptcy process.85 These misfits 
have no effective way to access bankruptcy’s core elements, even with a 
demonstrated need for them.86  
 
 80. See, e.g., Mark Koba, Dodd-Frank Act: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Apr. 30, 2012, 11:17 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/47075854 [https://perma.cc/FQQ9-SM8Z] (noting that after AIG 
found itself in a liquidity crisis in 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank created an $85 billion 
emergency fund to assist it). 
 81.  For example, the fact that marijuana is illegal at the federal level impedes access to 
federal bankruptcy relief for entities and people operating marijuana businesses that are legal at 
the state level. For a discussion of some of these issues, see generally Vivian Cheng, Comment, 
Medical Marijuana Dispensaries in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 105 
(2013). 
 82. See infra Part III. 
 83. See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout 
Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 987–88 (1992); Ann E. Cudd, A Contractarian Approach to Corporate 
Bailouts, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 284–85 (2013); Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: 
The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (2011) (proposing a 
framework to address future financial bailouts). 
 84. Bruckner, supra note 41, at 242. 
 85. See, e.g., Laura N. Coordes, Beyond the Bankruptcy Code: A New Statutory Bankruptcy 
Regime for Tribal Debtors, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 363, 365–66 (2019) (explaining this issue 
in the context of Indian tribes and tribal gaming corporations). 
 86. For an example of this and a discussion of Puerto Rico, see infra Part II.  
15
Coordes: Bespoke Bankruptcy
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
374 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
A.  Accommodating Bankruptcy Misfits 
The existence of bankruptcy misfits naturally leads to the question of 
what should be done for entities that the Bankruptcy Code does not 
accommodate. In the past, when Code-based bankruptcy did not or would 
not work for an entity, Congress has responded by either amending the 
Bankruptcy Code or creating bespoke bankruptcy. Each tactic is 
described in more detail below. 
1.  Bankruptcy Code Amendments 
Congress has shown a willingness to amend the Bankruptcy Code to 
accommodate some bankruptcy misfits. Two early examples are the Code 
chapters designed to address municipal debt and the debts of family 
farmers and family fishermen: Chapters 9 and 12, respectively.87 In 
addition, Congress has sometimes provided special subchapters within 
existing Bankruptcy Code chapters for specific types of debtors. The 
most recent and salient example of this is the Small Business 
Reorganization Act of 2019,88 which created a new Subchapter V within 
Chapter 11.89 
a.  Chapter 9 
Chapter 9 is the chapter of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress created 
to address municipal debt adjustment. During the Great Depression, U.S. 
municipalities began defaulting on their debts in record numbers.90 At 
that time, they had no access to bankruptcy relief; however, in 1933, 
Congress amended what was then the Bankruptcy Act to provide for 
municipal debt adjustment.91 After making some changes in response to 
concerns about the constitutionality of a federal system of municipal debt 
adjustment, Congress made the amendments a permanent part of the 
Bankruptcy Code.92  
Congress had to enact a new Code chapter rather than simply make 
municipalities eligible for Code-based bankruptcy relief because 
municipalities could not have used the bankruptcy laws as they existed at 
 
 87. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–46, 1201–32.  
 88. Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1181–95). 
 89. See id. For a discussion of how Subchapter V is specifically crafted to help small 
businesses in Chapter 11, see Christopher G. Bradley, The New Small Business Bankruptcy Game: 
Strategies for Creditors Under the Small Business Reorganization Act, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 251, 257 (2020). 
 90. See Daniel J. Freyberg, Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State 
Authorization to be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency and 
What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1997).  
 91. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Who Does Bankruptcy? Mapping Pension Impairment in Chapter 
9, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 585, 592 (2014). 
 92. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 313. 
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the time. This is because municipalities were so functionally different 
from the individual and business debtors that the existing bankruptcy law 
was designed to serve.93 Unlike a business, a municipality could not 
liquidate or sell many of its primary assets.94 Unlike consumers, 
municipalities could—in theory at least—generate revenue for debt 
payments through taxation.95  
In many ways, Chapter 9 functions as a modified version of Chapter 
11.96 Although Chapter 9 is supposed to address the unique needs and 
goals of municipalities in bankruptcy, Congress has, over the years, 
modeled Chapter 9 to look like Chapter 11.97 This is so even though the 
existing bankruptcy literature suggests that Chapter 9 should have 
distinctly different features.98 In practice, however, Chapter 9 cases have 
been described as “vastly different than any other type of bankruptcy 
case, with many surprising and unique qualities.”99 
Although Chapter 9 applies a version of Chapter 11’s toolkit to 
municipalities, it does account for the differences between a municipality 
and a commercial or consumer entity in several ways.100 Chief among 
these are Chapter 9’s eligibility requirements: unlike most business 
debtors, municipalities face significant hurdles before they can access 
bankruptcy relief, including the need for the state in which they are 
located to specifically authorize them to file.101 If a municipal debtor is 
deemed eligible for bankruptcy, the municipality’s relationship with its 
creditors and the court is also different from that of a typical commercial 
or consumer debtor. For example, only the municipality can submit a plan 
of debt adjustment, and the bankruptcy court’s powers are more limited 
with respect to the municipality’s property and political affairs.102  
 
 93. Skeel, supra note 18, at 2220. 
 94. Coordes, supra note 62, at 328. 
 95. See Skeel, supra note 18, at 2232. 
 96. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 315 (observing that “Chapter 9 borrows most of its 
provisions from other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code” and that “[i]ts most prominent contributor 
is Chapter 11”). 
 97. See Tatum, supra note 33, at 110 (noting that Congress has amended Chapter 9 to 
become more like Chapter 11). 
 98. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 315 (discussing the difficulty of using Chapter 11 rules 
to address a municipality’s “vastly different” problems). 
 99. Bill Pepper, Is the Gate Open for West Virginia Counties and Cities to File for Chapter 
9 Bankruptcy Relief?, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 883, 884 (2019). 
   100.  Bruckner, supra note 8, at 349–53 (noting salient differences between Chapters 9 and 
11). 
 101. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (listing the requirements for Chapter 9 eligibility). 
 102. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 903–04 (affirming the state’s powers over the municipality and 
limiting the bankruptcy court’s ability to interfere); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 356–57 (2010). 
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b.  Chapter 12 
After it became evident that family farmers and family fishermen 
could not effectively use existing Bankruptcy Code provisions, Congress 
created Chapter 12 to provide a specialized debt restructuring process for 
these bankruptcy misfits.103 To understand why a specialized process is 
necessary, it is helpful to examine the unique nature of a family farmer 
debtor. Unlike most businesses or individuals with predictable income 
streams, a farmer’s income is often volatile and can fluctuate wildly.104 
Farmers typically take out a line of credit from a single lender, which they 
repay in full on a yearly basis rather than making monthly payments.105  
After the collapse of the farm economy in the 1980s, family farmers 
found Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to be functionally useless to 
them.106 The volatility of the farmers’ income meant that they frequently 
lacked the means to provide adequate protection to their creditors.107 If a 
secured creditor did not receive adequate protection from the farmer, the 
creditor could lift the automatic stay, effectively ending the breathing 
space for the farmer, and foreclose on the farmer’s land.108 Furthermore, 
Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule, which requires full repayment of 
debts to creditors before equity holders can receive anything, prohibited 
most farmers from proposing a reorganization plan in which they retained 
ownership of the farm, because most farmers did not have the funds to 
repay creditors in full.109 
Family farmers were similarly unable to use Chapter 13, which is 
designed for the adjustment of individual debt. In addition to the 
problems discussed below with respect to Chapter 13 for small 
businesses, Chapter 13’s debt limits were too low for most farmers, and 
its requirement that plans must be completed in five years or less did not 
give most farmers sufficient time.110 In response to a wave of defaults 
“reminiscent of the Great Depression” hitting the family farm industry, 
Congress created Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1986.111 
Like Chapter 9, Chapter 12 draws heavily from existing chapters of 
the Bankruptcy Code—in this case, from Chapters 11 and 13, the two 
 
 103. See Jamey Mavis Lowdermilk, A Fighting Chance? Small Family Farmers and How 
Little We Know, 86 TENN. L. REV. 177, 181 (2018). 
 104. Id. at 184. 
 105. See id. at 183. 
 106. See id. at 188. 
 107. Id. at 189. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id.  
 111. Id. (quoting Mike Lowry, A New Paint Job on an ’85 Yugo: BAPCPA Improves Chapter 
12 but Will It Really Make a Difference?, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 231, 239 (2007)). 
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provisions farmers found themselves unable to use.112 For example, under 
Chapter 12, like in Chapter 13, there is no creditor vote on a plan.113 
Instead, unsecured creditors must receive all of the debtor’s disposable 
income during the plan term and must also receive at least what they 
would have received in a liquidation under Chapter 7.114 The practical 
effect of these provisions is that family farmers can keep their farms even 
if they do not pay their creditors in full, thus overcoming the limitations 
of Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule.115 However, Chapter 12 also 
contains some provisions that are unique to that chapter.116 For example, 
it allows debtors to write down debt secured by a principal residence.117  
Chapter 12 provides many benefits for family farmers and fishermen, 
enabling preservation of farm values and providing “increased leverage” 
for debtors.118 Though far from perfect, it offers relief to a particular class 
of debtors not otherwise addressed in the Bankruptcy Code.119 
c.  Subchapter V 
At first glance, it may seem exceedingly odd to have a separate 
bankruptcy process for small businesses. After all, small businesses are 
businesses—one of the groups the Bankruptcy Code was primarily 
designed to assist. Over the years, however, it became increasingly clear 
to Congress that Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code primarily worked 
well for larger businesses, even though “most chapter 11 business cases 
are filed by small business debtors.”120  
Small business debtors were bankruptcy misfits because the available 
Bankruptcy Code chapters did not work well for them. Chapter 13, which 
some small business owners could use as individual debtors, had debt 
 
 112. See SUMNER, supra note 63, at 1 (“Chapter 12 incorporates many of the same provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code as do Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 but with significant operative 
differences.”); Lowdermilk, supra note 103, at 190 (“The family farmer chapter is essentially a 
‘hybrid of’ chapters 11 and 13, but it is limited only to those engaged in farming or fishing.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Katherine M. Porter, Phantom Farmers: Chapter 12 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 729, 732 (2005))). 
 113. Lowdermilk, supra note 103, at 191.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See 11 U.S.C. § 1222. 
 118. Lowdermilk, supra note 103, at 196–97.  
 119. Id. (observing that “[w]ithout chapter 12, many thousands of family farms would have 
been foreclosed, and depressed farm values would have sunk even lower” (quoting Extension of 
the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act: Hearing on H.R. 5322 Before the Subcomm. on Econ. & Com. 
L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 21 (1992) (statement of Judge A. Thomas Small, 
J., Bankr. E.D.N.C.))). 
 120. H.R. REP. NO. 116–171, at 3 (2019). 
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limits that were simply too low for many small business owners.121 Other 
aspects of the Chapter 13 process, which is designed to address personal 
debt, did not work for small businesses that were not sole proprietors.122 
Additionally, small business owners were often excluded from Chapter 7 
bankruptcy thanks to the means test.123 This meant that the only option 
for which small business debtors were eligible was Chapter 11. And 
Chapter 11, designed primarily with large businesses in mind, was often 
too expensive and demanding for a small business debtor.124 
To address the unique needs of small businesses, Congress enacted 
the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, which created a special 
Subchapter V within Chapter 11 to address the needs of small 
businesses.125 Any “small business debtor,” defined as “a person engaged 
in commercial or business activities . . . that has aggregate noncontingent 
liquidated secured and unsecured debts . . . in an amount not more than 
$2,725,625 . . . not less than 50 percent of which arose from the 
commercial or business activities of the debtor,” may elect to reorganize 
under Subchapter V.126 Once a debtor elects Subchapter V, the case is 
designed to proceed much more quickly than an ordinary Chapter 11.127 
In general, there is no need for the debtor to submit a disclosure statement 
with its plan,128 and there is no creditors’ committee.129 In addition, the 
debtor is the only entity that can file a plan of reorganization.130 
Although Chapter 11 cases typically do not involve the appointment 
of a trustee or examiner, if a small business debtor elects to use 
Subchapter V, a trustee will be appointed as a matter of course.131 The 
Subchapter V trustee’s primary tasks are to help the debtor work toward 
 
 121. See Robert C. Meyer, Small Business Reorganization Act Arrives This Month, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1, 2020, at 8, 8. 
 122. See Amelia Niemi, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy & Small Business Owners, UPSOLVE (Sept. 
3, 2020), https://upsolve.org/learn/business-bankruptcy-chapter-13/ [https://perma.cc/L66L-
K4AX] (discussing how, in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the business is still responsible for debt 
repayment if it is a separate legal entity from the owner). 
 123. See Meyer, supra note 121, at 9. 
 124. See id. at 1 (noting that Chapter 11 requires “fees that are tenfold or more over what a 
chapter 13 costs” and “extensive writing in the form of disclosure statements, plans and more”). 
 125. See Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1181–95). 
 126. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D). Recently, Congress amended Subchapter V in response to the 
economic crisis the COVID-19 global pandemic created by temporarily increasing the debt limit 
for Subchapter V eligibility to $7.5 million. See Robb Mandelbaum, A New Small Business 
Bankruptcy Law Takes Effect, Just In Time, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 17, 2020, 8:15 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-17/a-new-small-business-bankruptcy-
law-takes-effect-just-in-time [https://perma.cc/75D4-TZD2]. 
 127. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1188(a) (requiring a court to hold status conference within sixty 
days); id. § 1189(b) (requiring a debtor to file a plan within ninety days). 
 128. See 11 U.S.C. § 1190(1). 
 129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181(b). 
 130. Id. § 1189(a). 
 131. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183. 
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a consensual reorganization plan and, once the plan is confirmed, to 
ensure that the debtor makes its plan payments.132 In addition, there are 
different requirements for plan confirmation under Subchapter V, 
including a modification of Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule.133 This 
modification allows small business owners to retain their businesses even 
if they do not pay their creditors in full, provided they commit all of their 
disposable income to plan payments during the life of the plan.134 
While Chapter 11 was designed for businesses, Congress eventually 
realized that the time, expense, and resources required to successfully 
complete a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case were “cumbersome for even 
medium-sized businesses.”135 By modifying the absolute priority rule, the 
new Subchapter V allows business owners to retain their ownership of 
the business, provided they meet certain requirements.136 Many of the 
other provisions of Subchapter V “streamline[] the path to 
reorganization” for small business debtors by removing requirements that 
are both time-consuming and expensive, such as preparation of a 
disclosure statement.137  
Despite being housed within Chapter 11, the new Subchapter V 
functions as a combination of Chapters 11, 12, and 13.138 Congress 
selected provisions from each of these chapters to fashion relief that is 
better suited to the particular needs of small business debtors.139 
2.  Bespoke Bankruptcy 
In addition to modifying the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has 
occasionally created bespoke bankruptcy—non-Code bankruptcy law 
designed for a particular group of debtors—in response to a perceived 
need to help bankruptcy misfits. Although bespoke bankruptcy contains 
 
 132. Id. §§ 1183(b)(4), (b)(7). 
 133. See id. § 1181. 
 134. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2). 
 135. Bob Lawless, The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 and COVID-19, CREDIT 




 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. (“Congress modeled the SBRA on Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code which 
has been used successfully, for years, to restructure the debts of family farmers with debts (now) 
up to $10 million.”). 
 139. Of course, Subchapter V is not the only instance where Congress has created modified 
versions of a Bankruptcy Code chapter for certain debtors. Other subchapters provide for special 
legal regimes to handle the financial distress of entities that are not traditional businesses, 
including for railroads and stockbrokers. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1161–74 (railroad 
reorganization); 11 U.S.C. §§ 741–54 (stockbroker liquidation). 
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the fundamental elements of bankruptcy described in Part I, this relief is 
provided outside of the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory scheme. 
a.  Dodd-Frank 
Dodd-Frank provides for an orderly liquidation process for distressed 
financial institutions that is overseen by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC).140 “During the darkest days of the Great Recession, 
Congress rushed through [Dodd-Frank] . . . in order to show it had done 
something before the 2010 mid-term elections.”141 Dodd-Frank 
recognizes that certain financial institutions that are “too big to fail” 
should be subject to more regulation and oversight through, for example, 
the submission of “living wills” to a federal regulator.142 When ex ante 
regulation fails to prevent financial distress, however, Dodd-Frank also 
provides for a collective process that “discharges the debtor’s 
obligations.”143 Specifically, it allows regulators to control the resolution 
process—a nod to the insolvency procedures banks and insurance 
companies use outside of bankruptcy.144 
Congress enacted Dodd-Frank two years after the 2008 financial 
crisis as part of a broader attempt at bank reform.145 Although bank 
holding companies may file for bankruptcy, banks themselves may not; 
instead, the FDIC acts as a receiver when a bank experiences financial 
distress.146 Congress enacted Dodd-Frank to strengthen bank regulation 
and to minimize systemic risk in the event that a systemically important 
financial institution (SIFI) were to succumb to distress.147 
Under Dodd-Frank’s “orderly liquidation mechanism,” the FDIC, as 
receiver, can seize, break up, and wind down a SIFI in distress.148 Dodd-
 
 140. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1377 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 
31, 42 U.S.C.). 
 141. James J. Angel, What Dodd-Frank Left Unfinished in Financial Reform, FORTUNE 
(July 22, 2015, 1:27 PM), https://fortune.com/2015/07/22/what-dodd-frank-left-unfinished-in-
financial-reform-five-year-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/3H64-Y3PU]. 
 142. 124 Stat. at 1376; Living Wills (or Resolution Plans), BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm [https://perma.cc/ANZ7-
KA9T]. 
 143. Skeel, supra note 18, at 2225. 
 144. See id. at 2224–25. 
 145. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: A CHEAT SHEET 8, 14, 16 (2010), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6 
VC-PAQ4]. 
 146. See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 
67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 986–87 (2010). 
 147. David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 7, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/ 
07/07/summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-regulation-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/PTZ4-VUYA]. 
 148. Id. 
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Frank also provides for government loans to the SIFI that are backed by 
its assets and ultimately repaid either during the resolution process or 
from other SIFIs.149 
Congress enacted Dodd-Frank instead of amending the Bankruptcy 
Code based on the belief that “[t]he failure of a systemically important 
financial institution is materially different from that of most nonfinancial 
businesses.”150 Dodd-Frank is a federal process for value-maximizing 
liquidation.151 Together, the federal government and the FDIC play a 
unique role in the orderly liquidation process in recognition of the fact 
that SIFIs are substantially different from the debtors the Bankruptcy 
Code was designed to accommodate.152 
b.  PROMESA 
PROMESA, the debt relief legislation passed to assist Puerto Rico 
and its territorial instrumentalities, is the most recent—and arguably most 
prominent—example of bespoke bankruptcy. PROMESA is a federal 
remedy that provides breathing space and the opportunity for an orderly, 
collective process to resolve competing creditor claims.153 But 
PROMESA encompasses other tools as well: the process is largely 
steered by an oversight board, and Puerto Rico has mechanisms for 
collective creditor action it may rely upon in lieu of the traditional 
bankruptcy-like process.154  
Puerto Rico had been in crisis for over a decade before Congress 
passed PROMESA. Nearly every facet of every level of the island’s 
 
 149. See id. 
 150. Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution 
Bankruptcy, 97 N.C. L. REV. 243, 249 (2019). 
 151. See Thomas W. Joo, A Comparison of Liquidation Regimes: Dodd-Frank’s Orderly 
Liquidation Authority and the Securities Investor Protection Act, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 47, 65–66 (2011). 
 152. In addition to Dodd-Frank, Congress has created other special legal regimes to address 
the unique circumstances that arise when financial institutions and other industry players fail. See, 
e.g., Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–78lll (protecting investors 
when a registered broker or dealer fails); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 187 (codified in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.) (creating the Resolution Trust Corporation to close insolvent thrifts and creating the 
Office of Thrift Supervision to regulate savings banks and savings and loans associations in the 
wake of the savings and loan crisis). 
 153. See Lorraine S. McGowen, The Impact of the New Restructuring Law on Puerto Rico 
Creditors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 20, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/20/the-impact-of-the-new-restructuring-law-on-puerto-
rico-creditors/ [https://perma.cc/6JAN-CAWW]. 
 154. See Guadalupe, supra note 12. 
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governing structure had some sort of fiscal problem.155 As is typical of 
governmental fiscal distress, the contributing factors were numerous, 
varied, and at times difficult to pinpoint.156 In Puerto Rico’s case, 
everything from local fiscal mismanagement to Wall Street greed157 to 
decades of U.S. federal policy158 played a role in the island’s fiscal 
turmoil. In part because of the number and variety of Puerto Rico’s 
problems, a one-size-fits-all framework such as the Bankruptcy Code was 
unlikely to address many, if not most, of these problems.159  
In April of 2016, the Puerto Rican government began coming to terms 
with the reality that it could not pay its bondholders what they were owed. 
At that time, then-Governor Padilla signed an emergency moratorium that 
attempted to justify Puerto Rico’s default on a $422 million bond 
payment due May 1.160 At the same time, the governor warned that the 
island would also default on a second, much larger payment due July 1.161  
On the mainland, Congress had been observing Puerto Rico’s descent 
into fiscal turmoil but had not yet acted to help. Legislators debated the 
merits of intervening in what some viewed as a local crisis that local 
mistakes caused.162 The governor’s April 2016 announcement, however, 
was a wake-up call, as Congress quickly realized that a failure to act could 
trigger a humanitarian crisis as well as a financial one.163  
 
 155. See Samuel Issacharoff et al., What is Puerto Rico?, 94 IND. L.J. 1, 32 (2019) (noting 
that Puerto Rico’s financial distress was both local and federal in nature); McGowen, supra note 
153 (observing that, in addition to the debt the commonwealth itself held,  many of Puerto Rico’s 
instrumentalities held significant debt); Morales, supra note 4 (describing the varied forms of 
Puerto Rico’s debt). 
 156. See Laura N. Coordes & Thom Reilly, Predictors of Municipal Bankruptcies and State 
Intervention Programs: An Exploratory Study, 105 KY. L.J. 493, 503–16 (2017) (discussing and 
categorizing numerous contributors to municipal fiscal distress). 
 157. See Laura Sullivan, How Puerto Rico’s Debt Created a Perfect Storm Before the Storm, 
NPR (May 2, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/02/607032585/how-puerto-ricos-
debt-created-a-perfect-storm-before-the-storm [https://perma.cc/V584-Q7DT] (“Wall Street kept 
pushing the Puerto Rican government’s loans even as the island teetered on default . . . .”). 
 158. See id. (describing a “special tax break” that brought business to the island but that 
Congress phased out beginning in 1996); Nathan Bomey, 6 Reasons Why Puerto Rico Slid into 
Financial Crisis, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
2017/10/04/puerto-rico-debt-crisis-bankruptcy-donald-trump/731091001/ [https://perma.cc/36K 
S-A2TR] (noting that because Puerto Rico does not receive as much Medicaid funding as U.S. 
states, the island has borrowed money to fund its healthcare system). 
 159. See Coordes & Reilly, supra note 156, at 547 (“[N]o one-size-fits-all solution for 
resolving municipal fiscal crises exists.”). 
 160. See Morales, supra note 4. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Here’s Why Puerto Rico’s Next Governor Will Inherit 
a Financial Mess, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/business/ 
puerto-rico-governor-restructuring.html [https://perma.cc/KAK5-MU99] (describing the local 
government’s “bad fiscal habits”). 
 163. See Morales, supra note 4. 
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As a result, Congress was more or less forced to act because Puerto 
Rico lacked access to bankruptcy relief. In 2014, the commonwealth 
attempted to address its financial situation by enacting the Puerto Rico 
Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act).164 The 
Recovery Act created a bankruptcy-like debt resolution process for 
Puerto Rico’s territorial instrumentalities.165 Investment funds, 
concerned about receiving cents on the dollar for their investments, 
immediately sued the commonwealth, claiming that the Recovery Act 
was unlawful.166 Specifically, the funds argued that the Bankruptcy Code 
prohibited Puerto Rico from implementing its own debt relief scheme.167 
The case, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,168 
ultimately went before the U.S. Supreme Court. In a 5–2 decision,169 the 
Court agreed with the funds, holding that the Bankruptcy Code 
preempted the Recovery Act even as it prohibited Puerto Rico from 
authorizing its instrumentalities to use the Code.170 Thus, Puerto Rico 
could neither use the Bankruptcy Code nor design its own debt relief. 
Perhaps recognizing that it was leaving Puerto Rico in a difficult position, 
the Court dropped a hint to Congress in dicta, observing that Puerto Rico 
was not “by definition” excluded from Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code 
and indicating that Congress could amend the Code to allow Puerto 
Rico’s instrumentalities to use it.171 
The Court’s decision in Franklin effectively thrust the matter back 
into Congress’s hands. However, although Puerto Rico was in obviously 
dire financial straits, the island’s relationship with the mainland United 
States was on rocky ground. The local government had repeatedly failed 
to respond to Congress’s calls for greater transparency with respect to its 
finances.172 Legislators on the mainland were frustrated by what they 
 
 164. 2014 P.R. Laws 371, 371; see also Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 
1938, 1942–43 (2016) (describing the Act and the events leading to its passage). 
 165. See Franklin, 136 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 903. 
 168. 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). 
 169. Justice Scalia had died and not yet been replaced. See Greg Stohr & Michelle Kaske, 
Scalia, Alito Court Absences Shape Puerto Rico Debt-Relief Bid, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 21, 2016, 
12:20 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/scalia-alito-court-absences-
shape-puerto-rico-debt-relief-bid [https://perma.cc/Y4N8-RQ5U]. Justice Alito recused himself 
from the case. Adam Liptak & Mary Williams Walsh, Supreme Court Rejects Puerto Rico Law 
in Debt Restructuring Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/ 
14/us/politics/supreme-court-rules-against-puerto-rico-in-debt-restructuring-case.html [https:// 
perma.cc/5M9C-58Y8]. 
 170. See Franklin, 136 S. Ct. at 1942.  
 171. Id. at 1948 (quoting Brief for Petitioner Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al. at 25, 
Franklin, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (No. 15-233)).  
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considered the island’s lack of cooperation and good faith.173 In addition, 
some members of Congress were wary of any law that could be perceived 
as a bailout of the island and its irresponsible local government.174  
Thus, when Congress ultimately drafted PROMESA, it took care to 
differentiate the law from a bailout or bankruptcy. In this way, Congress 
was able to get more support for the bill to quickly enact it into law.175 
Although the need for PROMESA—or some response to Puerto Rico’s 
fiscal distress—had been evident for years, PROMESA was still a “last-
minute compromise”176 that arose out of a desperate need to act.177 By 
avoiding the terms “bankruptcy” and “bailout,” Congress assuaged fears 
that PROMESA was a step toward bankruptcy (or bailout) for U.S. 
states.178 PROMESA’s wording enabled Congress to provide a path for 
fiscal relief for Puerto Rico while avoiding potentially drawn-out fights 
over politically charged terminology.179 
 
nothing to boost Congress’s confidence in Puerto Rico. See Karen Pierog, Puerto Rico Faces 
Tougher Scrutiny over Federal Medicaid Funding, REUTERS (July 17, 2019, 5:49 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-puertorico-congress/puerto-rico-faces-tougher-scrutiny-
over-federal-medicaid-funding-idUSKCN1UC2PI [https://perma.cc/9XU5-GSH7] (noting that, 
in the wake of the corruption scandal, federal lawmakers called for heightened scrutiny of Puerto 
Rico’s Medicaid program).  
 173. See Michael Moran, The Plot Against Puerto Rico, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 29, 2016, 6:18 
PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/29/puerto-rico-debt-default-lew-ryan-obama/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KW8Z-N3TZ] (observing how many members of Congress treated Puerto Rico’s 
distress as “a mere annoyance” and positing that “all sides condemn Puerto Rico’s poor record of 
financial governance”). 
 174. Veronique de Rugy, Is Congress Going To Bailout Puerto Rico?, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 
28, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/puerto-rico-bailout-congress-us-
territory/ [https://perma.cc/8DCD-5VC9] (“Republicans in Congress have been pretty 
consistently and rightfully opposed to bailing out the island.”). 
 175. See Hadžiomerović , supra note 26, at 1277 (arguing that PROMESA was “one of the 
only plausible courses of action available at the time because the political climate did not allow 
for a Code amendment”). 
 176. Cheryl D. Block, Federal Policy for Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments: 
The U.S. States and Puerto Rico, 53 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 227 (2017) (discussing 
Congress’s reasons and objectives for passing PROMESA). 
 177. See Tina Meng, Note, The Perfect Storm: Puerto Rico’s Evolving Debt Crises Under 
PROMESA, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 367, 382 (“After the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Franklin . . ., Puerto Rico was back where it had started—the territory was still buried under 
billions of dollars in unpayable debt but had no viable path towards solvency.”). In this respect, 
at least, PROMESA is typical: last-minute responses are common in bankruptcy law, particularly 
in municipal bankruptcy, which PROMESA closely resembles. See, e.g., Coordes, supra note 39, 
at 1228. 
 178. Skeel, supra note 67, at 873 (discussing the context and provisions of Title III of 
PROMESA); see 162 CONG. REC. S2,000–01 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. John 
Cornyn) (discussing how “taking advantage of bankruptcy law” is not equivalent to receiving a 
“bailout”). 
 179. David Skeel, Essay, Notes from the Puerto Rico Oversight (Not Control) Board 34th 
Pileggi Lecture, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 529, 535 (2019) (“Congress went to great lengths to avoid 
calling [Title III of PROMESA] bankruptcy.”). 
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Congress passed PROMESA on June 30, 2016, one day before the 
Puerto Rican government’s threatened July 1 default.180 With 
PROMESA’s passage, Congress enacted relief for Puerto Rico that came 
not from the Bankruptcy Code itself but from independent, bespoke 
legislation designed uniquely for Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities. 
Indeed, although PROMESA contains many of the hallmarks of 
bankruptcy law, it is more than bankruptcy. The law blends the traditional 
bankruptcy process with oversight mechanisms used for major U.S. 
cities, as well as sovereign debt restructuring techniques.181 This 
combination provided Puerto Rico with access to more restructuring 
options than a debtor would receive under the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, 
the Code was not designed to comprehensively address territory-level 
debts.182 At the same time, however, the island faced significantly more 
challenges and restrictions than a typical Bankruptcy Code debtor.  
PROMESA consists of three primary components. The first, Title III, 
is based on Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.183 Title III allows for a 
court-supervised debt restructuring, similar to the process under the 
Bankruptcy Code.184 Both Title III and Chapter 9 bankruptcy impose an 
automatic stay during the restructuring, which prevents creditors from 
taking actions to collect money owed by debtors and gives the debtor 
much-needed breathing space to negotiate with its creditors and devise a 
debt adjustment plan.185  
Although Chapter 9 and Title III are largely similar, several 
differences stand out. First, PROMESA’s oversight board, rather than the 
debtor, has the exclusive authority to file and submit a plan of debt 
adjustment.186 In addition, a district judge rather than a bankruptcy judge 
 
 180. See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 
Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549, 549 (2016) (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241). 
 181. See Skeel, supra note 67, at 864. 
 182. See Pottow, supra note 3, at 700 (noting that Puerto Rico’s territorial debt “would be 
exempt even if Chapter 9 applied”); see also Nathan A. Mooney, Note, Dealing With an Inevitable 
Case of “I Told-You-So”: Crafting a Framework for Resolving State Fiscal Distress Post-Puerto 
Rico, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 653, 670 (2019) (noting that Chapter 9 was “at best an imperfect 
solution” for Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities because (1) there was no process to adjust the 
debt the island’s central government issued; and (2) there was a dispute over whether special 
revenue bonds the island’s public utilities issued were protected from adjustment in bankruptcy). 
 183. See Bruce A. Wilson, PROMESA: A Summary of the Puerto Rico Oversight Legislation, 
KUTAK ROCK LLP (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.kutakrock.com/PROMESA-Puerto-Rico-
Oversight-Economic-Stability-Act/ [https://perma.cc/GP7R-JL2B].  
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. Despite these limitations, some view PROMESA as more debtor-friendly than 
Chapter 9. See Issacharoff et al., supra note 155, at 32 (“Overall, PROMESA has more protections 
for Puerto Rico during a bankruptcy than Puerto Rico would have obtained if its subordinate 
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oversees Puerto Rico’s restructuring.187 Despite the differences between 
Title III and Code-based bankruptcy, Title III does contain the traditional 
bankruptcy toolkit: it gives the debtor the ability to bind holdouts, for 
example, and imposes an automatic stay.188 
At least on paper, PROMESA’s oversight board—its second key 
component—has broad authority: it can approve fiscal plans and budgets, 
oversee operations, implement any changes necessary to comply with 
approved fiscal plans and budgets, approve debt issuances, hold hearings, 
issue subpoenas, enter into contracts, analyze pensions, approve 
voluntary settlements, and become a direct party in litigation against 
Puerto Rico or its instrumentalities.189 In addition, any budget the island’s 
local government passes must be consistent with a board-approved fiscal 
plan.190 Since the board’s creation, scholars have debated whether it 
possesses too much power or not enough.191 Others have described the 
board’s existence—as well as PROMESA as a whole—as paternalistic.192 
Like Title III, the oversight board is based on other debt relief 
mechanisms. Specifically, the board is primarily modeled on the financial 
control board that took over Washington, D.C.’s finances in the 1990s.193  
PROMESA’s third main component is Title VI, which provides for 
collective creditor action to modify bond terms.194 Specifically, Title VI 
allows bond terms to be modified without 100% bondholder consent.195 
This component of PROMESA draws from sovereign debt restructuring 
practices.196 The oversight board administers all Title VI proceedings.197 
 
 187. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Presiding Over Municipal Bankruptcies: Then, Now, and Puerto 
Rico, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 375–76 (2017). 
 188. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 673. 
 189. Wilson, supra note 183. 
 190. Id.  
 191. See, e.g., Victoria Zorovich, Note,  The Perfect Storm: Weathering Puerto Rico’s Fiscal 
Crisis in the Wake of Hurricane Maria, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1067, 1088 (2018) (arguing that 
Congress should give the oversight board more authority over the island’s fiscal management and 
humanitarian relief efforts); Skeel, supra note 67, at 873–74 (cataloguing the board’s powers and 
noting that they must be consistent with debt restructuring purposes); Walsh, supra note 162 (“A 
series of recent corruption scandals has prompted at least some members of Congress to ask 
whether the board’s powers should be expanded.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Issacharoff et al., supra note 155, at 33 (“However beneficial PROMESA may 
turn out to be, it is still a paternalistic intervention imposed from without.”). 
 193. See Skeel, supra note 67, at 865 (“The Washington D.C. oversight board is especially 
relevant to Puerto Rico, because both boards were created by Congress and because the 
Washington D.C. legislation served as the template for Puerto Rico’s oversight board.”). The New 
York Emergency Financial Control Board was another important influence. See id. at 864–65 
(calling New York City’s financial crisis the “watershed moment for oversight boards”). 
 194. See Wilson, supra note 183. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Skeel, supra note 67, at 872 (“Title VI . . . is similar to the collective action 
provisions that are used to restructure sovereign debt.”). 
 197. Id. at 873. 
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Title VI has been used only sparingly in Puerto Rico’s fiscal recovery 
process.198 In contrast, the board has filed five Title III proceedings, 
several of which contain numerous adversary proceedings.199 
Apart from its three primary components, PROMESA contains 
several provisions specific to Puerto Rico. These include provisions for 
infrastructure revitalization and provisions lowering the minimum wage 
of certain workers.200 While each primary component of PROMESA has 
precedent in other areas of restructuring law and practice, PROMESA 
uniquely combines these components, creating bespoke bankruptcy relief 
for Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities.201 
Puerto Rico easily qualifies as a bankruptcy misfit. It was in dire 
financial straits yet had no legal mechanism to adjust its debts. As a 
governmental unit, it could not shut down or liquidate assets,202 but it 
needed to break away from some of its contractual obligations and 
receive a discharge in order to continue functioning. At the same time, 
the Bankruptcy Code could not provide the island with the debt relief it 
so desperately needed without significant revisions. Not only was the 
Code not designed to address territorial debt, but scholars and 
policymakers were also deeply divided over which of the island’s many 
other debts bankruptcy could restructure.203 The political overlay—years 
of fiscal irresponsibility, a tumultuous relationship with the mainland 
United States, and decades of mutual mistrust—only made a Bankruptcy 
Code amendment less likely.204 All of these factors led Congress to 
choose bespoke bankruptcy for Puerto Rico.205 
 
 198. See id. at 876 (noting that, although the board considered using Title VI for the Puerto 
Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), it ultimately chose to address PREPA’s issues using 
Title III); Skeel, supra note 179, at 540 (describing the Government Development Bank’s 
voluntary restructuring under Title VI). 
 199. See Eva Lloréns Vélez, Fee Examiner in Puerto Rico Debt Restructuring Warns of 
Rising Litigation Costs, CARIBBEAN BUS. (June 7, 2019), https://caribbeanbusiness.com/fee-
examiner-in-puerto-rico-debt-restructuring-warns-of-rising-litigation-costs/ [https://perma.cc/ 
VZV6-SBK6].  
 200. See Wilson, supra note 183. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See Frank Shafroth, Seeking Shelter from a Quake, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY 
PROJECT (Jan. 7, 2020), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2020/01/07/seeking-shelter-
from-a-quake/ [https://perma.cc/7Z59-4UN7] (observing that “shut down” is not an option for 
local or state governments). 
 203. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 670. 
 204. See Tom C.W. Lin, Americans, Almost and Forgotten, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1253–
56 (2019) (observing that territories are differently situated from other U.S. political entities and 
that Americans living in the territories are treated differently from those living on the mainland). 
 205. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1655 
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B.  Future Reforms 
Many, if not most, of the major debates over the future of bankruptcy 
law are about whether or how to amend the Bankruptcy Code. Should 
Congress amend the Code to better address the needs of some debtors that 
already use it, as it recently did for small businesses? Should Congress 
add chapters or subchapters to better accommodate some entities—or 
simply to include other entities that have been previously excluded? 
Among proposals for additional chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
one that has seemingly gained the most traction is a proposal for a new 
Chapter 14, which would provide debt relief to some financial 
institutions, including bank holding companies.206 Although bank 
holding companies are currently eligible for Chapter 11 relief, in practice, 
bank holding company bankruptcy presents complications concerning 
how closely the holding company is related to the bank itself.207 A bill 
proposed in the Senate in 2018 aimed to complement and assist the 
process outlined in Dodd-Frank by providing for the 
“rapid . . . recapitalization of a failed financial institution.”208 
One of the primary justifications for a new Chapter 14 is that it could 
help SIFIs from collapsing without the need to resort to a bailout.209 
Although Dodd-Frank encourages bank holding companies to use the 
Bankruptcy Code, “critical resolution tools . . . currently are unavailable 
or not obviously available under the Bankruptcy Code.”210 The latest bill, 
the Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, would create 
“a process akin to Chapter 11 . . . but specifically for failing major 
banks.”211 In brief, it would provide a “single point of entry” approach, 
allowing the failing financial firm to quickly separate its “good” and 
“bad” assets while retaining key Chapter 11 protections, including the 
absolute priority rule and continuity of management of the bank.212 Such 
amalgamation of bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy (i.e., single point of 
 
 206. See Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Bankruptcy for Banks and Proposed 
Chapter 14, HARV. L. SCH. BANKR. ROUNDTABLE (Dec. 4, 2018), https://blogs.harvard.edu/ 
bankruptcyroundtable/tag/chapter-14/ [https://perma.cc/KR4Y-2NRP]. 
 207. See WARREN ET AL., supra note 42, at 832 (discussing the “cat-and-mouse game” 
Congress plays with the financial industry and gaps in the FDIC resolution system). 
 208. Big Bank Bankruptcy: 10 Years After Lehman Brothers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1 (2018) (statement of Mark J. Roe, Professor of Law, Harvard 
Law School) (emphasis omitted). 
 209. See id. (statement of Donald S. Bernstein, Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP).  
 210. Id. at 8 (statement of Stephen E. Hessler, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP).  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. at 4–7. 
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entry) techniques may work better than either bankruptcy or a single point 
of entry strategy standing alone.213 
Another attention-grabbing proposal to modify the Bankruptcy Code 
is for the creation of a Code chapter that U.S. states could use to file for 
bankruptcy. Although there is extensive debate in the academic literature 
over whether states could or should have access to bankruptcy relief, 214 
it is clear that state bankruptcy relief is not available under an existing 
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code and could not be made available without 
substantial modifications.215 As states face increasing amounts of debt, 
discussions of bankruptcy tools for them may become more practical and 
less theoretical.216  
Just as there have been proposals to create new chapters of the 
Bankruptcy Code, scholars have also proposed the creation of new 
subchapters. For example, Professor Bruce Markell has proposed 
creating a subchapter for individual Chapter 11 debtors.217 In previous 
work, I have advocated for the creation of subchapters to address the 
needs of healthcare debtors.218 Both of these proposals tout the use of 
subchapters as structural mechanisms that both emphasize and 
consolidate the different treatment the Bankruptcy Code already provides 
for these debtors.219 
Finally, there have been some infrequent proposals for bespoke 
bankruptcy laws. For instance, I have previously advocated for Congress 
to adopt a bespoke bankruptcy law for tribal corporations, arguing that 
they are fundamentally different from other business debtors, due to 
unique concerns about tribal sovereignty, among other things.220 
 
 213. See David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative, in ACROSS 
THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 311, 314 (Martin Neil Baily & 
John B. Taylor eds., 2014). 
 214. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy,” 59 UCLA 
L. REV. 322, 331–32 (2011) (proposing a “minimalist legal framework” that incorporates some 
bankruptcy protections for fiscally distressed states). For an excellent analysis of the pros and 
cons of state bankruptcy, see generally David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 677, 680, 683–84 (2012). 
 215. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 707 (proposing a PROMESA-like process for states). 
 216. Cf., e.g., Brian Chappatta, Ripples from Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis Reach the Mainland, 
BNN BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2019), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/ripples-from-puerto-rico-s-debt-
crisis-reach-the-mainland-1.1281398 [https://perma.cc/RB67-PB94] (discussing a lawsuit 
seeking to invalidate $14 billion in Illinois bonds that was inspired by Puerto Rico’s restructuring 
under PROMESA). 
 217. Bruce A. Markell, The Sub Rosa Subchapter: Individual Debtors in Chapter 11 After 
BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 73 (2007). 
 218. Coordes, supra note 27, at 465–66. 
 219. See Markell, supra note 217, at 70 (arguing that Congress could better achieve its 
desired changes for individual Chapter 11 debtors by creating “a separate subchapter”); Coordes, 
supra note 27, at 466 (discussing the benefits of subchapters for healthcare debtors). 
 220. See Coordes, supra note 85, at 365–67. 
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Furthermore, despite Congress’s efforts to the contrary, it is possible that 
PROMESA may function as a template for a bespoke state bankruptcy 
law in the future.221  
Most notably, perhaps, legislators in Congress continue to advocate 
for even more specialized debt relief for Puerto Rico. In July of 2018, 
Senator Warren introduced the U.S. Territorial Relief Act.222 Under Title 
I of the proposed Act, U.S. territories would have the option to terminate 
their unsecured debts upon meeting specified conditions.223 While Title I 
would apply to all territories, Title II would apply uniquely to Puerto 
Rico, creating the Puerto Rico Debt Restructuring Compensation Fund to 
provide federal funds to compensate some creditors whose debt was 
terminated under Title I.224 Finally, Title III of the Act would create an 
audit committee to specifically study Puerto Rico’s debt.225 In support of 
the Act, Senator Warren described how the hurricanes that have struck 
Puerto Rico make special debt relief for the territory necessary.226 
Although the Act has not become law, it is further recognition of the need 
for expanded bespoke bankruptcy relief, in this case for an entity that 
already uses a bespoke framework.227 
Over the years, Congress has adjusted bankruptcy law to 
accommodate bankruptcy misfits by either amending the Bankruptcy 
Code or creating bespoke bankruptcy relief. In the current debates over 
access to bankruptcy law, a discussion about using bespoke bankruptcy 
has largely taken a back seat to proposals for Code amendments. Of 
course, there are many times when amending the Bankruptcy Code may 
be preferable to creating a new bankruptcy law from whole cloth. But 
sometimes, particularly when substantial deviation from the Code’s 
templates is required, it may be better for Congress to experiment with 
 
 221. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 707. But see MICHAEL CEMBALEST, EYE ON THE 
MARKET 3 (2020), https://am.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-am-aem/global/en/insights/eye-
on-the-market/EOTM_05-04-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B8R-WPFH] (arguing for states to 
have access to Chapter 9 provisions in emergencies). 
 222. U.S. Territorial Relief Act of 2018, S. 3262, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 223. See id. § 101. 
 224. See id. §§ 201, 205. 
 225. See id. § 304. The Act was reintroduced the following year as the U.S. Territorial Relief 
Act of 2019. S. 1312, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 226. U.S. Territorial Relief Act of 2018, ELIZABETH WARREN (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/U.S.%20Territorial%20Relief%20Act%20Sum
mary%20Final%207.24.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9PD-JHMD].  
 227. See Jim Wyss, House Democrats Seek to Overhaul Puerto Rico Financial Oversight, 
BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2020, 7:45 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-
22/house-democrats-seek-to-overhaul-puerto-rico-financial-oversight [https://perma.cc/W5KX-
D9HA] (discussing proposal for additional bespoke relief for Puerto Rico by House Democrats to 
amend PROMESA to define some spending as essential public services, guarantee funding for 
the University of Puerto Rico, and require the federal government to finance the operations of the 
oversight board). 
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new legislation rather than force a square peg into a round hole. In these 
cases, bespoke bankruptcy may be the better answer. The next Part takes 
up the question of when and how legislators might best use bespoke 
bankruptcy to assist with resolving the bankruptcy misfit problem. 
III.  BESPOKE BANKRUPTCY 
Bespoke bankruptcy can be invaluable to bankruptcy misfits like 
Puerto Rico. However, it must be used sparingly and cautiously. This Part 
describes potential problems with overuse of bespoke bankruptcy and 
unveils a method to identify debtors in need of—and well-suited to—
bespoke relief. 
A.  Overuse Concerns 
Bespoke bankruptcy can perform a gap-filling function, providing 
debt relief options to entities that might genuinely need bankruptcy tools 
but that either cannot or should not use the Bankruptcy Code. As 
PROMESA illustrates, bespoke bankruptcy can also provide relief when 
amending the Bankruptcy Code is either impractical or politically 
infeasible. Yet, bespoke bankruptcy also comes with distinct drawbacks: 
it can create uncertainty, it may be difficult to implement, and it can be 
costly.228 Creditors may resist implementation of a bespoke framework, 
particularly one that alters expected priorities.229 This could lead to 
increased borrowing costs for debtors ex ante, in addition to substantial 
litigation costs once a debtor is in bankruptcy. 
By its very nature, bespoke bankruptcy is experimental. It can involve 
the creation of new elements or processes, or a combination of tools that 
has never been tried before. This experimentation can undermine parties’ 
expectations and risks favoring one party over another. It also naturally 
creates uncertainty. Notably, uncertainty has characterized much of the 
process with PROMESA. In February of 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit determined that the appointment of the oversight 
board’s members violated the Constitution’s Appointments Clause 
because the board’s members were never confirmed by the Senate.230 
 
 228. See Vélez, supra note 199 (“The professional fee burden on the Commonwealth 
increases dramatically as litigation proliferates.”). 
 229. A salient example of creditor resistance to bespoke bankruptcy is Aurelius Capital 
Management, which has led a substantial litigation effort against PROMESA. For a detailed 
account of this saga, see Jesse Barron, The Curious Case of Aurelius Capital v. Puerto Rico, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/magazine/aurelius-capital-v-
puerto-rico.html [https://perma.cc/LJ3D-6L77]. 
 230. See Melissa Jacoby, PROMESA Heads to the U.S. Supreme Court?, CREDIT SLIPS 
(June 24, 2019, 12:12 PM), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/06/promesa-heads-to-
the-supreme-court.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed% 
3A +creditslips%2Ffeed+%28Credit+Slips%29 [https://perma.cc/7GGX-ZGKJ]. 
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Although the Supreme Court ultimately determined that the board’s 
appointment was valid,231 the possibility that the board could be deemed 
unconstitutional and dismantled at any moment threatened to disrupt the 
board’s entire restructuring process and years of work.232 
Although the Supreme Court upheld the oversight board’s 
appointment, bondholders have found other ways to challenge other 
aspects of PROMESA. In June 2019, the First Circuit told a group of 
bondholders that they could not challenge PROMESA’s constitutionality 
in the PROMESA proceedings themselves.233 The court found that two 
provisions in PROMESA stripped the district court of its jurisdiction to 
grant the relief sought (a declaration and injunction to restore the flow of 
revenue to the bondholders) by the bondholders’ guarantor.234 In 
numerous other decisions, the district court and the First Circuit have 
rebuffed attempts by other bondholders to short-circuit the PROMESA 
process.235 Still, these lawsuits and others have crippled Puerto Rico’s 
efforts to move forward with a debt restructuring.236 
Even putting aside the legal challenges, the scope of the oversight 
board’s authority is regularly questioned, debated, and threatened. As a 
 
 231. See Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1655 
(2020). 
 232. See Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Top Court Takes on Puerto Rico Financial Oversight Board 
Dispute, REUTERS (June 20, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-puerto 
rico/u-s-top-court-takes-on-puerto-rico-financial-oversight-board-dispute-idUSKCN1TL2DJ 
[https://perma.cc/7F8B-KHXJ].  
 233. See In re Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 927 F.3d 597, 601–03, 605 (1st Cir. 
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 856 (2020). 
 234. See id. at 601–03. 
 235. See, e.g., Bill Rochelle, First Circuit Nixes Another Attempt at Unraveling Puerto 
Rico’s Debt Arrangement, ROCHELLE’S DAILY WIRE (June 26, 2019), https://www.abi.org/ 
newsroom/daily-wire/first-circuit-nixes-another-attempt-at-unraveling-puerto-rico%E2%80%99 
s-debt-arrangement [https://perma.cc/L92S-NRZB] [hereinafter Rochelle, First Circuit]. In 
January of 2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari from a First Circuit decision “holding that 
bondholders cannot compel payment during the course of restructuring proceedings and before 
confirmation of a plan.” Bill Rochelle, Supreme Court Won’t Hear a Case to Compel Paying 
Puerto Rico Bondholders Currently, ROCHELLE’S DAILY WIRE (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://www.abi.org/newsroom/daily-wire/supreme-court-won%E2%80%99t-hear-a-case-to-
compel-paying-puerto-rico-bondholders [https://perma.cc/X249-BMVU]. 
 236. See Steven Church, Puerto Rico Judge Imposes 120-Day Pause on Bankruptcy Suits, 




/JLM3-GG3G]; Maria Chutchian, Puerto Rico Oversight Board Gears Up for Latest Challenge 
to Debt Restructuring, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2021. 6:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
bankruptcy-puerto-rico/puerto-rico-oversight-board-gears-up-for-latest-challenge-to-debt-restru 
cturing-idUSL1N2JH34Q [https://perma.cc/RUL6-9MME] (discussing a challenge from Ambac 
Assurance Corporation that claims that PROMESA violates the uniformity requirement in the 
Constitution). 
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result, there is often little certainty about who is in charge of what on the 
island. For example, Puerto Rico’s former governor, Ricardo Rosselló, 
frequently challenged the oversight board and sought to curb its authority. 
In July of 2018, Governor Rosselló sued the board, claiming that it had 
“usurped his power and authority.”237 The following year, the oversight 
board rejected Governor Rosselló’s spending plan and sought to impose 
its own budget on the territory.238 Governor Rosselló and the board were 
in near-constant dispute over who had the right to enact spending plans 
and the extent to which each party could veto the other’s decisions.239 
The Governor’s challenges were echoed by the Puerto Rican public. 
Protesters filled the streets outside the board’s meeting places, claiming 
that the board represented a lack of democratic self-governance.240 
Governor Rosselló’s departure in the summer of 2019 created more 
uncertainty for Puerto Rico; indeed, the protesters who demanded 
Rosselló’s resignation also fought the board’s continued presence on the 
island.241 Many Puerto Rican legislators vehemently opposed Rosselló’s 
designated successor, Pedro Pierluisi, because of his connections to and 
work with the oversight board.242 
From a legal standpoint, the board’s authority over certain aspects of 
Puerto Rican governance remains unclear. District Judge Laura Taylor 
Swain, who is overseeing Puerto Rico’s Title III proceedings, has 
indicated that the board’s actions should have some basis in the fiscal 
plan—but her opinion has left the board with some leeway to interpret 
the meaning of “some basis.”243 Furthermore, as Judge Swain herself 
 
 237. Frank Shafroth, The Fiscal Challenges of Federalism, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY 
PROJECT (July 13, 2018), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2018/07/13/the-fiscal-
challenges-of-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/A79N-JAF2]. 
 238. See Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico Board to Impose Cuts in Fight with Governor (1), 
BLOOMBERG L. (May 28, 2019, 5:55 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-
law/puerto-rico-board-to-impose-cuts-in-fight-with-governor-1 [https://perma.cc/P5NX-ZSL4]; 
Michael Deibert, Puerto Rico Fiscal Board Seeks Deeper Budget Cuts than Governor, 
BLOOMBERG L. (July 1, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/puerto-
rico-fiscal-board-seeks-deeper-budget-cuts-than-governor [https://perma.cc/3DHC-UF9P]. 
 239. See Walsh, supra note 162 (“Mr. Rosselló and the board have long been at odds.”).  
 240. See Edwin Melendez, Is Congress’ Plan to Save Puerto Rico Working?, CONVERSATION 
(July 31, 2017, 5:30 PM), https://theconversation.com/is-congress-plan-to-save-puerto-rico-
working-80785 [https://perma.cc/3GLC-W2QV].  
 241. See Michael Deibert et al., Puerto Rico Governor’s Resignation Shakes Bankrupt 
Commonwealth, BLOOMBERG L. (July 25, 2019, 6:09 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
bankruptcy-law/puerto-rico-governors-resignation-shakes-bankrupt-commonwealth [https:// 
perma.cc/4LV9-4M62]. 
 242. Michelle Kaske & Michael Diebert, Puerto Rico’s Governor Is Going. Who Comes Next 
Is Less Certain, BNN BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/puerto-rico-s-
governor-is-going-who-comes-next-is-less-certain-1.1296288 [https://perma.cc/R9AZ-GE3X]. 
 243. See Skeel, supra note 67, at 878 (discussing Judge Swain’s decision, which 
“emphasized that the Board’s powers are not unlimited” and “admonished the Board and the 
government to work together”). 
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acknowledged, PROMESA created a “power-sharing structure that 
allows for mutual sabotage.”244 “The unsettled question of the board’s 
power has been a defining theme of the island’s attempts to end its fiscal 
crisis.”245 Without a clear understanding of the extent and scope of the 
oversight board’s power, everything the board does is subject to legal 
challenge and possible reversal. Notably, even as the Supreme Court 
recognized that the board had been properly appointed, Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor surmised in her concurrence that the board and its actions may 
still be illegitimate.246  
Puerto Rico’s future is still uncertain, and its experience with 
PROMESA illustrates that Congress’s choice to provide bespoke relief 
can create significant problems. Because bespoke bankruptcy is, by its 
very nature, novel and experimental, norms and rules that typically apply 
in Code-based bankruptcy settings may not transfer to bespoke 
bankruptcy. The resulting uncertainty surrounding bespoke bankruptcy’s 
application can encourage legal challenges, political posturing, and even 
protests.  
More broadly, widespread use of bespoke bankruptcy could turn 
bankruptcy into a law of exceptions, possibly threatening the coherence 
of U.S. bankruptcy law. If bankruptcy law becomes more fragmented, 
there will be fewer opportunities for parties to establish norms and 
practices with respect to particular bankruptcy processes, with the result 
that parties could simply revert to the familiarity of Code-based 
bankruptcy even if a bespoke option is present.  
A related concern is surfacing with respect to the treatment of the 
University of Puerto Rico’s debt under PROMESA. It is unclear whether 
a debt restructuring or the austerity measures taken by the oversight board 
would constitute a “bankruptcy” for purposes of Title IV of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965.247 If it does, the University of Puerto Rico would 
 
 244. Steven Church, Puerto Rico Asks Judge to Force Federal Board to Share Its Power, 
BLOOMBERG L. (July 25, 2018, 5:46 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-
law/puerto-rico-asks-judge-to-force-federal-board-to-share-its-power [https://perma.cc/K2NN-
3WLD]. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1683 
(2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“These cases raise serious questions about when, if ever, the 
Federal Government may constitutionally exercise authority to establish territorial officers in a 
Territory like Puerto Rico, where Congress seemingly ceded that authority long ago to Puerto 
Rico itself.”). 
 247. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 
1161aa–1); The Status of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act 
(PROMESA): Lessons Learned Three Years Later: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 
116th Cong. 82, 85–86 (2019) (statement of Dr. Ana Cristina Gómez-Pérez, Associate Professor, 
Univ. of P.R.) (quoting Scott F. Norberg, Bankruptcy and Higher Education Institutions, 23 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 385, 385 (2015)) [hereinafter The Status of PROMESA]. 
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be ineligible for federal funding.248 Put differently, bespoke bankruptcy 
runs the risk of making the concept of “bankruptcy” itself unstable, which 
in turn affects nonbankruptcy law. For this reason, this Article has taken 
care to separate the concept of “bankruptcy” from the Bankruptcy Code; 
however, in practice, there may be good reason to view the Bankruptcy 
Code as synonymous with “bankruptcy” law more generally.249  
In addition, because bankruptcy is federal in nature; widespread use 
of bespoke bankruptcy, particularly in those situations where bankruptcy 
relief has previously been unavailable, may be seen as federal 
government overreach. In Puerto Rico’s case, this concern has surfaced 
as part of the local population’s distrust and resentment of the oversight 
board and the policies it is enacting, which have directly affected Puerto 
Ricans’ daily lives.250 
In other cases, bespoke bankruptcy may be useful but not worth the 
effort. For example, designing bespoke relief may not be worthwhile if 
the entities in question are not vulnerable to significant financial distress, 
or if nonbankruptcy mechanisms, such as receiverships, prove to be 
adequate in addressing financial distress. 
For all of these reasons, the use of bespoke bankruptcy should be 
limited. However, there are still times when bespoke bankruptcy is the 
only option that will provide relief for a debtor that desperately needs it. 
The next Section addresses how to determine eligibility for bespoke 
bankruptcy, as well as when a bespoke solution should be preferred over 
Code-based relief. 
B.  Further Use of Bespoke Bankruptcy 
Bespoke bankruptcy may have significant potential to assist some 
bankruptcy misfits; however, the concerns articulated above caution 
against its widespread adoption. To date, Congress has developed 
bespoke bankruptcy only in response to crises: Dodd-Frank came about 
 
 248. See The Status of PROMESA, supra note 247, at 85 (“[T]he University depends on Title 
IV funds for its survival and yet the Fiscal Plan violates the eligibility requirements of Title IV.”). 
 249. A related issue arises with respect to eligibility for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) 
loans, which the Small Business Administration (SBA) is administering to help businesses address 
the economic fallout from COVID-19. See Alex Wolf, Virus Aid Continues to Elude Bankrupt 
Companies as Deadline Hits, BLOOMBERG L. (June 30, 2020, 5:16 AM), https://news.bloomberg 
law.com/bankruptcy-law/virus-aid-continues-to-elude-bankrupt-companies-as-deadline-hits 
[https://perma.cc/J3AA-JA6Q]. Companies in bankruptcy are prohibited from applying for the 
loans under the SBA’s rules, and some must “navigat[e] the waters between the PPP and 
reorganizing their businesses to survive.” Id. Although hypothetical, it is worth questioning 
whether, if a bespoke regime were available, companies would take advantage of a bespoke 
process that does not call itself “bankruptcy” in order to maintain eligibility for PPP loans, as well 
as whether such a strategy would or should succeed. 
 250. See Barron, supra note 229 (discussing the oversight board’s decision to reduce public 
pensions as “a denial of basic democratic principles”). 
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because of the Great Recession, while Puerto Rico’s looming defaults 
spurred Congress to enact PROMESA. Hastily enacted legislation may 
work well as a stopgap measure, but legislation that has been passed after 
consideration and debate may prove more robust in the long term.251 
Thus, it is worth considering whether and how Congress might identify 
entities that are good candidates for bespoke bankruptcy, as well as how 
Congress could assess if bespoke bankruptcy’s benefits outweigh its costs 
for these candidates. This Section proposes a mechanism to achieve these 
results, consisting of an initial eligibility test followed by a four-factor 
assessment of any entities that pass the eligibility test. Each component 
of this mechanism is described more fully below. 
1.  The Eligibility Test 
To determine whether an entity is minimally eligible for bespoke 
bankruptcy, this Article proposes a viability test. Specifically, 
policymakers should seek to identify entities that have no choice but to 
survive due to the public importance of the goods or services they 
provide. Put differently, this test asks whether an entity must remain 
viable to avert significant, systemic public harm—whether the entity, by 
virtue of what it provides, is “too important to fail.”252 Use of the viability 
test means that bespoke bankruptcy does not replace the Bankruptcy 
Code for the majority of debtors that currently use it. 
 
 251. See Wyss & Kaske, supra note 1 (“The implementation of Promesa without a 
comprehensive development plan has proved to be difficult, if not unsuccessful.”). The numerous 
challenges PROMESA has faced since its enactment illustrate how speedy legislation can become 
an easy target for its critics. See, e.g., Michelle Kaske, Ambac Seeks to Dismiss Puerto Rico’s 
Record Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG L. (May 26, 2020, 9:20 PM), https://news.bloomberg 
law.com/bankruptcy-law/ambac-seeks-to-dismiss-puerto-ricos-record-bankruptcy [https://perma 
.cc/QSR6-CX2B] (discussing allegations that PROMESA is unconstitutional); see Fin. Oversight 
& Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1671–83 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (questioning whether Congress had the power to create the PROMESA oversight 
board). 
 252. Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Too Important to Fail: Bankruptcy Versus Bailout of Socially 
Important Non-Financial Institutions, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 159, 164 (2017). For a discussion of 
“socially important non-financial institutions” that might pass this test because they are “too 
important to fail,” see id. at 161–62, 173, 175. In addition to these entities, others may pass the 
viability test if they, as a group, will overwhelm the economy in the absence of a bailout. These 
entities may include companies that are critically important to the economy, such as the auto 
industry, or even insurance companies. See, e.g., TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN 
GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 222 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004) (quoting an auto industry analyst 
describing Chrysler as “too big, too important, [having] too many employees, and [paying] taxes 
in too many states for the government not to consider seriously the possibility of the company 
going out of business”). A full exploration of these entities is outside this Article’s scope; 
however, if these entities pass the viability test as a group, the current, ad hoc bailout processes 
that have been used for their rescue in the past should be weighed against the benefits of a bespoke 
bankruptcy regime. 
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A viability test makes sense as an eligibility floor in part because the 
Bankruptcy Code often implicitly assumes that debtors will have the 
choice to either liquidate assets or reorganize.253 The Bankruptcy Code’s 
own structure reinforces the idea of choice for the vast majority of debtors 
it accommodates.254 For example, a business debtor may proceed under 
Chapter 11 or under Chapter 7.255 Individuals may choose to either 
liquidate their debts under Chapter 7 or keep their assets and propose a 
repayment plan under Chapter 13.256 Debtors that must remain viable, 
however, lack a meaningful choice among options: they must continue in 
their role as providers of important public goods and services despite their 
financial distress. 
The viability test also makes sense given the high potential costs of 
bespoke bankruptcy. If an entity is important enough that it must survive 
despite financial difficulties, it is arguably worth going through the 
trouble of creating a bespoke process to save it, if one is needed.257 Put 
differently, a viability test for bespoke bankruptcy makes sense because 
the entities that can pass this test have a need for survival that justifies the 
increased uncertainty and cost associated with the process of creating 
bespoke legislation. 
Some scholars have already begun to recognize that Code-based 
bankruptcy does not work well for these “too-important-to-fail” 
entities.258 Many of them are, in essence, too big for bankruptcy—their 
problems go beyond those that the procedures in the Bakruptcy Code are 
designed to address. As a result, the federal government must often get 
involved when these entities face financial distress.259 To this extent, the 
viability test can mitigate concerns about federal government overreach, 
as the federal government may have to be involved in the resolution of 
these entities’ financial distress, regardless of the mechanism they use. In 
 
 253. See supra Section I.B. 
 254. See 11 U.S.C. § 109. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. The question of whether a bespoke process is actually needed is dealt with through the 
four-factor assessment, discussed in Section III.B.2. 
 258. Azgad-Tromer, supra note 252, at 162–63 (arguing that the bankruptcy process 
suboptimally values new investment opportunities for many of these entities). 
 259. See id. at 173. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act recognizes that certain financial 
institutions that are “too big to fail” should be subject to more regulation and oversight by, for 
example, the submission of “living will[s]” to a federal regulator. See Living Wills (or Resolution 
Plans), supra note 142; see also Brian Chappatta, OPINION: MTA Can’t Go Bankrupt. So How 
Does It Survive?, BLOOMBERG L. (June 29, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
bankruptcy-law/opinion-mta-cant-go-bankrupt-so-how-does-it-survive [https://perma.cc/E37A-
86GQ] (discussing how Congress has provided money to the Metropolitan Transit Authority in 
New York to cover decreases in ridership during the COVID-19 pandemic and noting that “[t]o 
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other words, the viability test can be used to identify entities that require 
federal government involvement because of their importance to society 
at large. 
Puerto Rico and its territorial instrumentalities are obvious examples 
of the type of entities that would pass the viability test. The government 
of Puerto Rico provides innumerable essential services to the Puerto 
Rican people, including education, social services, and utilities.260 
Although some government assets may be liquidated,261 an entire 
liquidation of the territory’s assets would be unthinkable. And, as 
previously discussed, Code-based bankruptcy was not an option for 
Puerto Rico and its territorial instrumentalities and would not have been 
an option without substantial modifications.262 As a result, the federal 
government had to get involved to assist the island with resolving its 
fiscal distress. 
2.  The Four-Factor Assessment 
Although the viability test substantially limits access to bespoke 
bankruptcy, the question remains whether bespoke bankruptcy is worth 
the effort, even for eligible entities. Thus, once an entity has passed the 
initial viability test, policymakers should further assess the entity’s need 
for bespoke bankruptcy using the four factors articulated below. 
Numerosity. The numerosity factor assesses how many of these 
entities exist. A critical question that must be addressed with respect to 
bespoke bankruptcy is how tailored the bespoke law can be without 
running afoul of the Constitution’s requirement that Congress create 
uniform bankruptcy laws.263 Notably, at least one scholar has expressed 
concern that PROMESA violates this uniformity requirement because 
Title III of the Act effectively applies only to Puerto Rico, and not to 
other U.S. territories.264 Thus, the number of entities a proposed bespoke 
bankruptcy law would cover is important, not just because it may not be 
worth the effort to create bespoke relief for only one entity, but also 
 
 260. See Puerto Rico, USA.GOV, usa.gov/state-government/Puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/ 
H5CG-7REQ] (listing the territory’s major agencies); About the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau, P.R. 
ENERGY BUREAU, https://energia.pr.gov/en/about-the-commission/ [https://perma.cc/FP8D-YENH]. 
 261. See Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Board Approves Liquidation of Government Development 
Bank, REUTERS (July 14, 2017, 9:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-
gdb-restructuring/puerto-rico-board-approves-liquidation-of-government-development-bank-id 
USKBN1A0012 [https://perma.cc/J5QH-SCG8] (discussing the oversight board’s decision to 
wind down Puerto Rico’s Government Development Bank). 
 262. See supra Section II.A.2.b. 
 263. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”). 
 264. See Stephen J. Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About 
Uniformity, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53, 54 (2017). 
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because of the need to avoid the creation of “private” bankruptcy laws.265 
Practically speaking, “bespoke bankruptcy” means development of 
bespoke relief for a category of entities as a group rather than 
development of a bespoke framework for individual entities. 
Consideration of the numerosity requirement is also important because 
the cost of developing and implementing bespoke bankruptcy would 
skyrocket if a bespoke framework were tailored to each individual debtor 
in a group. 
Similarity. The similarity factor asks how similar entities are to each 
other. Development of a bespoke bankruptcy framework for individual 
entities should be discouraged for reasons related to the Constitution’s 
uniformity requirement described above, as well as for efficiency 
concerns. Instead, policymakers should assess whether an entity—for 
example, the territory of Puerto Rico—may be placed in a broader 
category of entities (e.g., all U.S. territories). To the extent that territories 
can be expected to face similar financial problems, it may make sense to 
adopt one bespoke framework for all territories as a group rather than 
bespoke bankruptcy for each individual territory.  
Mismatch. This factor examines how well Code-based bankruptcy 
does or should work for the entities in question. In evaluating this factor, 
policymakers should take a hard look at the obstacles (or lack thereof) to 
simply amending the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate these debtors. If 
the entities in question are not eligible for Code-based bankruptcy, or if 
there is a significant conflict prohibiting the entities’ access to Code-
based relief, this factor weighs in favor of bespoke bankruptcy. On the 
other hand, if an entity’s access to or use of bankruptcy can be easily 
accommodated through amending the Bankruptcy Code, this factor 
weighs in favor of Code-based bankruptcy.266 Even if there is substantial 
 
 265. Id. at 58 (observing that the Supreme Court has “provided Congress with the ability to 
enact laws dealing with geographically isolated problems, as long as the law operates uniformly 
upon a given class of creditors and debtors”); see also Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the 
Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 227 (1957) (“[I]t is no accident, we think, that the 
Bankruptcy Clause speaks of ‘uniform laws,’ rather than one ‘uniform law,’ which Congress may 
pass on the subject of bankruptcies, thus leaving Congress a free hand in adopting, if it so desired, 
different laws for different types of debtors.”); Todd Zywicki, Bankruptcy Clause, HERITAGE 
FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/constitution/articles/1/essays/41/bankruptcy-clause [https:// 
perma.cc/SP92-55RU] (“The ‘uniformity’ requirement does, how-ever, forbid ‘private’ 
bankruptcy laws that affect only particular debtors.”). 
 266. Part II extensively describes instances where Congress has amended the Bankruptcy 
Code to provide easier access to or use of bankruptcy procedures. Other examples of access to 
bankruptcy that a Bankruptcy Code amendment would accommodate include the Family Farmer 
Relief Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-51, 133 Stat. 1075, which expanded the debt limit for Chapter 
12 bankruptcy eligibility, and the Honoring American Veterans in Extreme Need Act of 2019 
(HAVEN Act), Pub. L. No. 116-52, 133 Stat. 1076, which excluded Veterans Affairs and Defense 
Department disability payments from the means test that determines bankruptcy eligibility for 
individual debtors.  
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mismatch between use of the Bankruptcy Code and the entities’ needs, 
policymakers should still evaluate the existing alternatives to bankruptcy, 
if any, for the entities in question. 
Tribal gaming corporations that are subject to the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA)267 provide a good example of mismatch. 
Although these entities are technically eligible for bankruptcy, there are 
significant conflicts between Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule and the 
Code requirement that the estate preserve assets for the benefit of 
creditors, on the one hand, and the IGRA’s requirement that a tribe hold 
the sole proprietary interest in a gaming operation, on the other.268 These 
conflicts, along with other concerns about how tribal sovereignty might 
be reconciled with a federal bankruptcy regime, suggest a high degree of 
mismatch between a distressed tribal gaming operation’s needs and the 
Bankruptcy Code’s responsiveness to those needs.  
Vulnerability. Finally, the vulnerability factor seeks to ascertain the 
risks to the financial stability of the entities in question. Another way of 
looking at this test is to assess an entity’s need for the basic elements of 
bankruptcy relief. Do these entities need a compulsory, collective debt 
adjustment process due to the presence of competing creditor claims? Do 
they need breathing space in the form of an automatic stay or other 
moratorium to ensure their survival? Are there any concerns about 
financial mismanagement or systemic vulnerabilities in the way these 
entities are operated? Puerto Rico, for example, had multiple competing 
claims and a desperate need for breathing space to relieve it from its 
payment obligations. Further, the island was particularly vulnerable to 
economic shocks after years of fiscal mismanagement.  
3.  Some Thoughts on Process 
The mechanism just described to determine the need for and 
usefulness of bespoke bankruptcy—a viability test combined with a four-
factor assessment—is information-intensive and requires rigorous 
analysis. Thus, it is important to consider who would use this mechanism 
in practice. This Article has referred to “Congress” and “policymakers” 
more generally as those who would undertake the decision of whether 
and when to pass bespoke bankruptcy; ultimately, Congress would have 
the final say in the matter.269 However, much of the heavy lifting would 
likely be done through the use of other experts, such as legal scholars, 
 
 267. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166–68 and 25 
U.S.C. §§ 2701–21). 
 268. See Coordes, supra note 85, at 382 (discussing extensive concerns about tribal 
sovereignty, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority 
rules). 
 269. Per the Constitution, Congress has the power to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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think tanks, and industry groups. This raises the additional concern that 
the process surrounding the creation of bespoke bankruptcy may be 
subject to lobbying, partisan debate, and other forms of undue influence. 
Unfortunately, this is a concern with the legislative process more 
generally, and it is a concern to which the Bankruptcy Code itself is not 
immune.270 Although the extent to which special interests have 
dominated the legislative process is debatable,271 this concern does 
highlight the need for information sharing and nonpartisan research to 
play a role in the development of bespoke bankruptcy. 
C.  The Proposal in Action 
This Section provides a high-level, illustrative example of how this 
Article’s proposed mechanism would work. It concludes that 
subsovereign entities, particularly U.S. states and some municipalities, 
would likely benefit from bespoke bankruptcy. Although subsovereigns 
are certainly not the only entities that may require bespoke bankruptcy, 
an examination of subsovereign debtors makes particular sense in light 
of PROMESA’s relatively recent passage and questions that have arisen 
among government leaders about the possibility of state bankruptcy.272 
The remainder of this Section illustrates how policymakers might 
approach the factors and questions this Article’s proposal articulates. 
Although this Article makes a case for subsovereigns to receive bespoke 
bankruptcy, a full and detailed inquiry—beyond what this Article 
highlights—into the considerations the proposal outlines would need to 
be undertaken before proceeding with the development of bespoke relief.  
Subsovereigns clearly pass the viability test, making them minimally 
eligible for bespoke bankruptcy relief. These entities are the backbone of 
public life: they provide necessary services to the citizens that live within 
their borders. As Professor Clay Gillette wrote with respect to general-
purpose municipalities: 
[L]ocal government provision addresses a market failure that 
would otherwise leave a void in service provision, 
 
 270. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & 
Beyond, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1903 (2006) (addressing the common concern that the 2005 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were the product of industry capture and arguing instead 
that the legislative process balanced multiple, competing interests).  
 271. See id. at 1876. 
 272. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, McConnell Says States Should Consider Bankruptcy, Rebuffing 
Calls for Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirus-
mcconnell-states-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/G4VA-H7RQ]. In addition, other territories, 
such as the U.S. Virgin Islands, may also require bespoke bankruptcy relief. See Amanda Albright, 
There’s a New Muni-Debt Crisis Brewing in Another U.S. Territory, BLOOMBERG QUINT (Oct. 1, 
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notwithstanding significant demand. Local government 
intervention becomes all the more important given that many 
of the services that have the characteristics of public goods 
are crucial to a high quality of life. These include security 
(police and fire), transportation (street maintenance), and 
health (sewer and water). . . . [I]f localities fail to provide 
these services in an adequate manner, residents with 
insufficient mobility will be unable to obtain them from any 
alternative source, given their undersupply in the private 
market. Local government incapacity to provide these 
services, therefore, constitutes an abrogation of the very 
functions for which the locality was 
created. . . . [M]unicipalities are created in large part to 
provide public goods and services not available in the market 
. . . .273 
State governments similarly provide crucial services, including 
“police protection, education, highway building and maintenance, 
welfare programs, and hospital and health care.”274 Liquidation of state 
and municipal assets would create significant public harm. These 
subsovereigns are clearly “too important to fail.”275 
Moving on to the four-factor test, both states and municipalities are 
numerous. A proposed bespoke bankruptcy law for states would cover all 
fifty states, and a proposed bespoke bankruptcy law for municipalities 
could cover nearly 90,000 municipal governments.276 Adopting bespoke 
bankruptcy for either states or municipalities would not cause concern 
about “private” bankruptcy laws. 
Assessing the similarity factor requires a bit more nuance. Every state 
and municipality is managed differently. Yet, the basic structure of the 
services states provide and the ways in which they fund them (e.g., 
 
 273. Clayton P. Gillette, How Cities Fail: Service Delivery Insolvency and Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211, 1221–22 (2019). 
 274. Financing State and Local Government, USHISTORY.ORG, https://www.ushistory.org/ 
gov/12b.asp [https://perma.cc/B8AL-KGC2]. 
 275. Further evidence of the “too important to fail status” of states and municipalities comes 
from the Federal Reserve’s municipal lending facility, which was created during the COVID-19 
pandemic to allow states, counties, and cities to borrow from the federal government. See An 
Illinois Default Is Unlikely, Citigroup Says, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (June 8, 2020, 1:28 PM), 
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/government/illinois-default-unlikely-citigroup-says (describing 
how Illinois has used the municipal lending facility). 
 276. The most recent data available indicate a total of 89,476 municipal governments, made 
up of 39,044 general-purpose local governments and 50,432 special-purpose local governments. 
For a detailed breakdown, see Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution, 
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through taxation) seem to indicate that states could be grouped together 
for purposes of bespoke bankruptcy.277 Indeed, this is exactly what some 
proposals for Code-based state bankruptcy contemplate: one chapter of 
the Bankruptcy Code that would be devoted to the needs of all states.278 
Municipalities are slightly more complicated. Generally speaking, 
municipalities can be broken down into “general-purpose,” such as cities, 
towns, and counties, and “special-purpose,” such as school districts, 
sewage districts, and water districts.279 Special-purpose municipalities 
are functionally and structurally distinct from general-purpose 
municipalities.280 This has led some scholars to suggest that separate 
bankruptcy procedures be used for special-purpose municipalities and 
general-purpose municipalities.281 An analysis of the similarity factor 
suggests that a proposal could be made for bespoke legislation to 
separately address states, general-purpose municipalities, and special-
purpose municipalities. 
The mismatch factor also does not break down evenly between states 
and municipalities. Substantial adjustment to the Code would be 
necessary before it could accommodate U.S. states as debtors.282 
Although states are ineligible for Code-based bankruptcy, municipalities 
have an entire chapter of the Bankruptcy Code devoted to them. 
However, Chapter 9 bankruptcy often fails municipalities in critically 
important ways. Arguably, most general-purpose municipalities have 
succeeded in spite of Chapter 9, rather than through strict adherence to its 
framework.283 The Detroit bankruptcy, which was hailed as a success,284 
ended as quickly and consensually as it did only because negotiators 
 
 277. See Financing State and Local Government, supra note 274 (discussing trends in state 
and local revenues and expenses). 
 278. See, e.g., Role of Public Employee Pensions in Contributing to State Insolvency and the 
Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Com. & Admin. 
L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 32 (2011). 
 279. Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution, supra note 276.  
 280. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 348–49. 
 281. See, e.g., id.; Buccola, supra note 73, at 854 n.136 (noting that special-purpose 
municipalities “present different considerations” than general-purpose entities because they 
“frequently resemble the commercial firms that file under Chapter 11 more than they do general 
purpose municipalities” and concluding that “Chapter 9 may work reasonably well for most 
special purpose debtors”). 
 282. Mooney, supra note 182, at 702. 
 283. For a detailed discussion of how Chapter 9 often fails municipalities, see generally 
Coordes,  supra note 62. 
 284. See, e.g., Pete Saunders, Detroit, Five Years After Bankruptcy, FORBES (July 19, 2018, 
1:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petesaunders1/2018/07/19/detroit-five-years-after-
bankruptcy/#e5a2d87cfebb [https://perma.cc/82P4-ZFSM] (“Five years on, however, it’s 
incredible how far Detroit has come.”); Corey Williams, 5 Years After Declaring Bankruptcy, 
Detroit Reborn at a Cost, CHI. TRIB. (July 16, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
business/ct-biz-detroit-reborn-20180716-story.html [https://perma.cc/4H4P-X23L] (“The 
turnaround since [the bankruptcy] has been remarkable . . . .”). 
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working outside of the Chapter 9 process struck the Grand Bargain, a deal 
that arguably altered the priority rules typically seen in bankruptcy.285 In 
contrast, Vallejo, California, which completed a more traditional Chapter 
9 bankruptcy, has been beset by the same financial difficulties that caused 
it to enter bankruptcy in the first place.286 
Chapter 9’s mismatch with the needs of general-purpose 
municipalities, in particular, is evident from both legal scholarship and 
practice. Most scholars that study Chapter 9 in depth have proposed 
substantial changes to the process,287 observing that “[t]he current tools 
available to municipal . . . governments are insufficient to address the 
size, scale, and complexity of the fiscal situation” they are facing.288 
Questions of priority, and particularly a municipality’s ability to prioritize 
pensioners over bondholders in light of state constitutional law and other 
constraints, suggest that Code-imposed priorities are at best undefined 
and at worst at odds with the practical realities of municipal debt 
restructuring.289 Other scholars have pointed out that municipal distress 
can affect multiple jurisdictions at once; however, Chapter 9 only 
addresses one municipality at a time.290  
 
 285. See Coordes, supra note 69, at 1265–66 (describing the extraordinary role of mediators 
in the Detroit bankruptcy); Nathan Bomey et al., Judge OKs Bankruptcy Plan; a ‘Miraculous’ 
Outcome, DET. FREE PRESS (Nov. 7, 2014, 9:34 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/ 
local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/07/rhodes-bankruptcy-decision/18648093/ [https://perma.cc/ 
UXA6-L2MT] (“Several major financial creditors . . . argued repeatedly during the case that the 
grand bargain was illegal because it favored pensioners over other creditors.”). 
 286. See  Coordes, supra note 62, at 308, 324 (discussing Vallejo and other examples of how 
Chapter 9 “undermines the very objectives it is designed to help municipalities accomplish”). 
 287. See Coordes, supra note 62, at 342 (arguing that Chapter 9, as currently used, 
contravenes many bankruptcy principles); Coordes & Reilly, supra note 156, at 496, 498 
(describing the numerous and varied factors contributing to municipal fiscal distress and the 
inadequacy of Chapter 9 alone to resolve that distress); Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal 
Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 654 (2008) (discussing Chapter 9 
in conjunction with oversight mechanisms); Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 415–16 (2014) (arguing for a combination 
of state and federal tools to aid distressed municipalities); Aurelia Chaudhury et al., Junk Cities: 
Resolving Insolvency Crises in Overlapping Municipalities, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 459, 466 (2019) 
(advocating for coordination among distressed municipalities). 
 288. Mooney, supra note 182, at 697. 
 289. For a fuller discussion of state and municipal pension issues, see generally James E. 
Spiotto, What Illinois Can Learn from the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and Even Puerto Rico 
About Public Pension Reform, MUNINET GUIDE (Aug. 1, 2019), https://muninetguide.com/what-
illinois-can-learn-from-the-supreme-court-of-rhode-island-and-even-puerto-rico-about-public-
pension-reform/ [https://perma.cc/NF52-LVZX]. The City of Detroit arguably altered the 
Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme when it did not treat pensioners and bondholders equally. See 
Coordes, supra note 62, at 321 n.102 (observing that the city chose to pay its retirees more than 
its financial creditors, over objections from bond insurers). 
 290. See, e.g., Chaudhury et al., supra note 287, at 482. 
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To be successful, municipal bankruptcy in practice looks very 
different from the process Congress envisioned through Chapter 9.291 In 
practice, Chapter 9 seems to work best when combined with other tools, 
such as an emergency manager, increased state (or other external) 
funding, or a team of experienced mediators.292 This suggests that debt 
relief for general-purpose municipalities, such as cities, towns, and 
counties, requires more than what Code-based bankruptcy can provide. 
Notably, a different analysis may apply to special-purpose 
municipalities. These municipalities and their capital structures often 
look more like businesses than their general-purpose counterparts.293 
Because of this, Chapter 9 may not pose as much of a mismatch for 
special-purpose municipalities.294 
Alternatives to bankruptcy for these subsovereigns often pose their 
own problems. Although the federal or state government may provide 
additional funding for state or local governments in distress,295 bailouts 
raise concerns about moral hazard.296 It is technically possible for 
general-purpose local governments to dissolve or merge with other 
localities; however, dissolutions or consolidations occur only rarely and 
are often subject to stringent conditions.297 It is perhaps more likely that 
some special-purpose municipalities, such as school districts or hospitals, 
could be dissolved, with a new legal entity created to replace them; 
 
 291. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 
YALE J. ON REG. 55, 57 (2016) (noting that Detroit’s success in Chapter 9 might be credited to the 
bankruptcy court and that this “defies the conventional wisdom about municipal bankruptcies in 
the legal world”). 
 292. See id. at 59 (noting the strategy used in Detroit, which was “structured . . . around levers 
of control: active case management, deal-making and settlement promotion, team building, and a 
‘court of the people’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 293. See Buccola, supra note 73, at 858, 861. 
 294. See id. at 858 (noting that the “primary target” of early municipal bankruptcy legislation 
was the debt of special-purpose municipalities). 
 295. For example, the Federal Reserve has established a municipal liquidity facility, which 
will purchase short-term notes from state and local governments in order to help them manage 
their cash flow during the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. See Municipal 
Liquidity Facility, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetary 
policy/muni.htm [https://perma.cc/CL5C-6X2X]. Ultimately, however, the Federal Reserve is 
expecting to be repaid for these purchases, so the facility can hardly be deemed a bailout. See BD. 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 13(3) OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT: MUNICIPAL LIQUIDITY FACILITY 1 (2020), https://www.federal 
reserve.gov/publications/files/municipal-liquidity-facility-4-16-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDB6-
X35K]. 
 296. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 
HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1080 (2013) (observing that there is a strong case for adopting formal 
restructuring when bailout is the alternative). 
 297. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1386 (2012) 
(discussing dissolutions); Laura N. Coordes, When Borders Dissolve, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 649, 
653 (2018) (discussing consolidations). 
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however, this process may jeopardize creditors’ access to tax revenues 
generated by the entity. Finally, Congress has sought to limit the ability 
of states to adjust the debts of their municipalities on their own through 
measures such as compositions.298 
The extent to which states and municipalities are truly vulnerable to 
financial shocks is a hotly debated issue. Some commentators point out 
that states, and to some degree municipalities, can address revenue 
shortfalls through their power to tax.299 At the same time, there are 
practical limitations on a state or local government’s taxing power. 
Notably, tax increases can spur residents to leave if they are unwilling to 
pay the increases.300 Exogenous shocks, for example a global pandemic 
or recession, may make it difficult or impossible for residents to pay their 
taxes.301 And although the federal government has occasionally been 
willing to assist financially troubled state and local governments, such 
relief is limited and difficult to come by.302 Furthermore, states cannot 
print their own currency or refuse to pay their debts if the federal 
government requires them to do so.303 As others have recognized, many 
states are facing looming pension crises, and some mechanism to deal 
with these crises will be necessary in the future.304 Thus, there is a very 
real possibility that states may find themselves in a position similar to 
that of Puerto Rico: facing multiple creditors, layers of debt, and an 
 
 298. SAM HOBBS, AMENDING THE MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 79-2246, at 
4 (1946) (reporting on H.R. 6682’s overruling of the Supreme Court’s decision in Faitoute Iron 
& Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, which upheld a state law permitting municipal debt adjustment 
only if 85% of the city’s creditors agreed, by expressly prohibiting state laws that provided for 
debt adjustment without full creditor consent). 
 299. See, e.g., Josh Barro, Why Mitch McConnell’s State Bankruptcy Idea Is So Stupid, 
INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 26, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/04/why-mitch-mcconnells 
-state-bankruptcy-idea-is-so-stupid.html [https://perma.cc/B6HE-CZ6D] (observing that “states 
have the power to tax, and to increase taxes in times of budget shortfall”). But see Colin McGrath, 
Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federalism, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1265, 1267 
(2016) (“The proliferation of tax revolts across the United States during [the late 1970s and 
1980s] . . . further depressed local governments’ access to operating funds.”). 
 300. See Gillette, supra note 273, at 1213. 
 301. Id. at 1215–16. 
 302. For example, the Federal Reserve’s municipal liquidity facility, launched due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, was designed to be used only as a last resort and is available only to states 
and localities meeting a particular population threshold. See Bradley N. Ruwe & Marc T. Kamer, 
The Federal Reserve’s Municipal Liquidity Facility: Providing Financial Relief But at What 
Cost?, DINSMORE (May 20, 2020), https://www.dinsmore.com/publications/the-federal-reserves-
municipal-liquidity-facility-providing-financial-relief-but-at-what-cost/ [https://perma.cc/N2K7-
3KY6] (describing the facility as a “last resort” and discussing eligibility for its use); see also 
Coordes & Reilly, supra note 156, at 500 (discussing the flaws and limitations of state intervention 
programs). 
 303. See Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 282 n.326 (2005) 
(noting constitutional limitations on state authority). 
 304. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 677 (discussing data about pension crises in the states). 
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inability to simply liquidate assets due to the important public services 
they provide.305 
After weighing the above factors, it seems reasonable to assume that 
certain subsovereigns, such as states and general-purpose municipalities, 
would be good candidates for bespoke bankruptcy. If that is the case, 
what benefits could one expect bespoke bankruptcy to provide? The 
primary overarching benefit of bespoke bankruptcy would be to resolve 
the mismatch between these subsovereigns and Code-based relief. For 
example, a bespoke system could provide for deviations from Code-based 
priority or even an entirely different priority scheme than the Bankruptcy 
Code articulates.306 As Congress did with PROMESA, a bespoke 
framework could also provide for coordinated debt relief across 
jurisdictions—for example, debt relief for multiple municipalities or a 
municipality and the state in which it is located, in one coordinated 
process.307 Moreover, a bespoke framework would give Congress more 
leeway to design more appropriate relief in general—for example, by 
developing new plan confirmation standards for subsovereigns.  
Commentators have long observed that the Code’s plan confirmation 
standards, which are largely borrowed from Chapter 11’s standard 
template, do not work well in Chapter 9.308 As an example of just how 
difficult it is to apply these standards in practice, the judge overseeing the 
Detroit bankruptcy looked to his conscience and sense of morality to 
resolve difficult questions regarding the confirmation of Detroit’s debt 
adjustment plan.309 Bespoke bankruptcy could provide for alternative 
plan confirmation standards that are more specific to and appropriate for 
 
 305. See id. at 688 (“[D]ealing with restructuring social benefits is more complicated 
politically and constitutionally.”); Alexandre Tanzi, Nine States Face Economic Contraction, 
Most Since 2009 Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 2, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/articles/2020-01-02/nine-states-face-economic-contraction-most-since-2009-
crisis [https://perma.cc/R6UA-HX9F] (observing that the economies of nine states are expected 
to contract within six months and that this is the greatest number of states in this position since 
July of 2009). 
 306. See Mooney, supra note 182, at 737 (noting that priorities in state or municipal 
bankruptcy might need to be different). 
 307. See Chaudhury et al., supra note 287, at 507 (“Puerto Rico’s current debt restructuring 
process offers a real-world test of what a system built around the concept of tax-base insolvency 
might look like in the context of overlapping jurisdictions.”). 
 308. See, e.g., Michael J. Deitch, Note, Time for an Update: A New Framework for 
Evaluating Chapter 9 Bankruptcies, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705, 2726–27 (2015) (discussing 
inconsistencies in Chapter 9 plan confirmation orders); Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan 
Confirmation Standards and the Role of State Choices, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 75 (2015) 
(discussing the lack of clarity in Chapter 9 plan confirmation standards). 
 309. Coordes, supra note 62, at 342 n.241. 
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subsovereign debtors.310 If Congress used bespoke bankruptcy in lieu of 
Chapter 9 for general-purpose municipalities, it could work to provide 
those entities with a menu of options that is both more expansive than and 
substantially different from the Bankruptcy Code’s standard templates. 
Bespoke bankruptcy may also be a better avenue than Code-based 
bankruptcy for those who would like to extend bankruptcy protection to 
states. Indeed, others have already suggested that, even though Puerto 
Rico differs from a state government in important ways,311 PROMESA 
could serve as a template for state bankruptcy, should the need or desire 
arise to provide bankruptcy for states.312  
Importantly, this Article does not advocate for expanding bankruptcy 
access to U.S. states. A full discussion of the merits and drawbacks of 
doing so is beyond this Article’s scope and has been taken up by others.313 
Rather, this Article simply contends that if a debt relief mechanism is 
ultimately adopted for the states, such a mechanism should be bespoke 
rather than Code-based.314 
Regardless of whether it is applied to municipalities, states, or both, 
bespoke bankruptcy could provide for coordination of bankruptcy and 
nonbankruptcy tools. For example, in the municipal context, bespoke 
bankruptcy could offer a combination of a judicial debt adjustment 
process with use of an oversight board or financial manager, as well as 
an explicit role for the state. Scholars have already advocated for these 
options as part of municipal bankruptcy reform.315 For states and 
territories, bespoke bankruptcy could offer a combination of traditional 
bankruptcy relief and sovereign debt restructuring tools, similar to the 
way that PROMESA incorporates both options. Finally, bespoke 
bankruptcy may even have rhetorical benefits. As recent discussions 
about state bankruptcy have shown, “bankruptcy” is a politically charged 
 
 310. There is already a developing literature about specific changes to Chapter 9 plan 
confirmation standards that may be desirable to implement. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & 
Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 466 (1993) (exploring the use of the confirmation standards as a means 
for influencing governance); C. Scott Pryor, Who Pays the Price? The Necessity of Taxpayer 
Participation in Chapter 9, 24 WIDENER L.J. 81, 85 (2015) (discussing the possibility of using the 
feasibility standard to account for taxpayer interests). 
 311. See Block, supra note 176, at 238–40 . 
 312. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 182, at 713–18 (proposing a PROMESA-like process for 
states). Professor Skeel has also proposed an alternative to state bankruptcy in the form of a federal 
oversight strategy. See Skeel, supra note 214, at 729, 731. 
 313. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 214, at 335–43 (discussing the merits of expanding 
bankruptcy access to the states). See generally Skeel, supra note 214 (exploring the benefits of 
state bankruptcy in addition to the reasons for resisting this framework). 
 314. See generally, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 214 (proposing a solution enabling states to 
work out their debt problems with creditors).  
 315. See Kimhi, supra note 102, at 385 (arguing for oversight boards); Moringiello, supra 
note 308, at 75 (arguing for increased state involvement). 
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word.316 Indeed, although it includes a bankruptcy process, PROMESA 
contains no reference to “bankruptcy” at all. Because it exists outside of 
the Bankruptcy Code, bespoke bankruptcy can be framed as something 
other than bankruptcy and therefore may pass a political litmus test that 
Code-based bankruptcy cannot. 
The fact that subsovereigns such as state and local governments pass 
the viability test mitigates, but likely does not completely resolve, 
concerns about federal government overreach. As Puerto Rico’s 
experience with PROMESA illustrates, concerns about federal 
encroachment are always present when considering oversight 
mechanisms linked to debt restructuring. To the extent possible, Congress 
should work with state and local leaders if and when it develops bespoke 
bankruptcy for these subsovereigns, and it should emphasize the extent 
to which bespoke bankruptcy can represent a partnership among 
governments rather than an imposition by Congress. 
Relatedly, a core purpose of this Article’s proposal is to identify 
candidates for bespoke bankruptcy ex ante—before distress hits. 
Although it is arguably difficult to entice Congress—or any entity—to 
plan for possible fiscal distress,317 identifying candidates and exploring 
options for bespoke relief before distress hits has significant advantages. 
Although it cannot be stated for certain, it is possible that many of the 
problems Puerto Rico has experienced with PROMESA’s 
implementation could have been mitigated or avoided entirely by careful 
drafting or coordination with the territorial government. For example, the 
litigation surrounding the constitutionality of the oversight board’s 
appointment might have been resolved in advance by simply providing 
for the Senate to confirm the President’s board choices. And the inclusion 
of local leaders in the drafting of PROMESA may have mitigated some 
of the negative perceptions associated with PROMESA on the island. 
Another reason to develop bespoke bankruptcy ex ante relates to 
creditor expectations. Experience with both PROMESA and municipal 
bankruptcies has shown that creditors will vehemently resist post-distress 
alterations in priority.318 Indeed, as discussed, one of the key problems 
with municipal bankruptcy is the lack of a defined priority scheme that 
clearly applies in the municipal context. Creating a defined priority 
 
 316. See CEMBALEST, supra note 221 (“That’s why it was disappointing to see [state 
bankruptcy] . . . framed in the press as a crude partisan divide after comments from Senator 
McConnell and various reactions to them.”). 
 317. See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 71, at 1183 (“No mayor wants to be the one who has 
put his or her city in bankruptcy.”). 
 318. See, e.g., Rochelle, First Circuit, supra note 235; Joseph Lichterman, Protecting Detroit 
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scheme in advance allows parties to know where they stand relative to 
others if and when bankruptcy occurs. 
Finally, although this Article has used subsovereigns as an illustrative 
example of the type of entity that may benefit from bespoke relief, this 
does not represent the full scope of bespoke bankruptcy’s potential 
applications. Other debtors—private as well as public—may qualify for 
bespoke bankruptcy. For example, utilities may be another candidate for 
consideration. As PG&E’s recent bankruptcy shows, utilities often 
provide critical public services and play a significant public role, such 
that financial distress that provokes concerns about viability often 
necessitates government involvement.319 In PG&E’s bankruptcy, a 
creditor group even argued that the company was overly focused on value 
maximization to the detriment of the residents and businesses it serves as 
customers.320 And observers have concluded that bankruptcy has not 
worked well for PG&E, suggesting that it is “exiting bankruptcy facing 
many of the same challenges as it did the day it filed.”321  
 
 319. For example, PG&E is incredibly important to the public of California, to the point 
where the governor has threatened a state-led takeover of the utility if it does not quickly 
reorganize in Chapter 11. See Mark Chediak, California Governor Threatens to Step in and 
“Restructure” PG&E, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2019-11-01/california-governor-threatens-to-step-in-and-restructure-pg-e [https://perma 
.cc/N8RV-DCHQ]; Steven Church, PG&E May Pay $1 Billion in Financing Fees to Banks, 
Backers, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2019, 2:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
11-07/pg-e-fees-may-hit-1-billion-for-turnaround-bankers-and-backers  [https://perma.cc/6JN8-
W8C2] (observing that the PG&E bankruptcy is unusual in part due to the impact on millions of 
people and the state governor’s involvement). PG&E is a private entity, but it has a significant 
public impact. Steven Church & Mark Chediak, PG&E Falls After Losing Legal Fight Over 
California Fire Policy, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Nov. 29, 2019, 10:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2019-11-27/pg-e-loses-fight-over-wildfire-policy-that-led-to-its-bankruptcy 
[https://perma.cc/R38E-C3P5] (noting that PG&E is treated similarly to a public entity in 
California). Indeed, the Governor of California functionally had to approve PG&E’s bankruptcy 
plan. See Mark Chediak, PG&E Plunges as It Races to Meet Governor’s Bankruptcy Demand, 
S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/PG-E-plunges-as-it-
races-to-meet-governor-s-14909701.php [https://perma.cc/85T6-SHTC]. 
 320. See Scott Deveau & Mark Chediak, Elliott Bashes PG&E Bankruptcy Plan as Failing 
State Guidelines, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 12, 2019, 9:34 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
bankruptcy-law/pimco-elliott-group-presses-newsom-to-reject-pg-e-restructuring [https://perma 
.cc/58XT-AXT8]. 
 321. Mark Chediak, PG&E Is Set to Exit Bankruptcy, Ending Saga Sparked by Fires, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-
energy/pg-e-bankruptcy-judge-says-he-will-approve-companys-plan-1 [https://perma.cc/Q3GA-
SCXY] (noting that PG&E “will emerge from Chapter 11 having nearly doubled its debt to more 
than $38 billion”); see also Mark Chediak, PG&E Bankruptcy Judge to Confirm Restructuring 
Plan, BLOOMBERG L. (June 17, 2020, 8:44 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-
and-energy/pg-e-bankruptcy-judge-to-confirm-restructuring-plan [https://perma.cc/W5BV-F7JD] 
(quoting the bankruptcy judge who confirmed PG&E’s plan as saying that rejecting the plan “‘is 
not an acceptable alternative’ because there are no other options on the table”). 
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In addition to utilities, there are many other possibilities to explore. 
A review of the existing bankruptcy literature suggests that mass tort 
cases,322 churches,323 nonprofits,324 and public universities325 are all 
potential candidates for a bespoke regime. In short, other bankruptcy 
misfits exist and should be considered as possible contenders for bespoke 
relief. As scholars continue to uncover the difficulties that these and other 
entities experience, the framework proposed above will help them reach 
a determination about whether a bespoke regime is indeed necessary or 
appropriate in any given instance. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bankruptcy Code provides debt relief for a vast number of 
entities every day. But it does not, and cannot, accommodate every entity 
that might seek to use it. This Article explored whether and when 
Congress might consider adapting bankruptcy law to accommodate 
certain bankruptcy misfits. In particular, it advocated for the expanded 
use of a concept that has already been introduced into U.S. bankruptcy 
law: bespoke bankruptcy. To date, bespoke bankruptcy has been used too 
little and too late—it has been developed for only a handful of bankruptcy 
misfits and only on an ex post, ad hoc basis. It is thus an undertheorized 
and underutilized concept. 
Over the years since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the legal 
community has come to recognize that traditional, Code-based 
bankruptcy mechanisms do not serve all debtors well and that concepts 
such as bankruptcy priority, feasibility, and value maximization do not 
apply evenly across the board.326 At the same time, the lack of any 
alternative framework in most cases has meant that many bankruptcy 
misfits end up using Code-based bankruptcy simply because that is the 
only option available. This Article encourages the robust exploration of 
 
 322. See, e.g., Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort 
Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (2004) (“The problem of ‘future claimants’ plagues 
the resolution of mass tort bankruptcies.”). 
 323. See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., “Sovereignty” Issues and the Church Bankruptcy Cases, 
29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 345, 346 (2005) (“Of particular concern was the danger that the 
bankruptcy laws, which provide for extensive oversight of the debtor’s finances, might interfere 
with the religious affairs of the church, thus running afoul of the First Amendment guarantee of 
free exercise of religion.”). 
 324. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable 
Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
31, 32–33 (2012) (discussing the challenges nonprofit institutions face in bankruptcy). 
 325. See, e.g., Bruckner, supra note 41, at 241 (observing that higher education institutions 
“are effectively precluded from reorganizing in bankruptcy because of financial disincentives 
created by Congress”). 
 326. See, e.g., Azgad-Tromer, supra note 252, at 162–63; Christopher K. Odinet, Of 
Progressive Property and Public Debt, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2016). 
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bespoke bankruptcy alternatives to Code-based bankruptcy relief and 
offers a proposal to identify candidates for bespoke bankruptcy. 
To be clear, proposing further consideration and development of 
bespoke bankruptcy does not mean that bespoke bankruptcy is problem-
free, or even less prone to problems than its Code-based cousin. As this 
Article has repeatedly emphasized, there are many legal, political, and 
practical considerations that must be accounted for in the development of 
any bespoke framework. For this and other reasons, this Article has 
proposed that bespoke bankruptcy be available only to a small subset of 
debtors—those who can, at a minimum, pass this Article’s viability test. 
Although this subset of debtors is small in number compared to those 
eligible for Code-based bankruptcy, it includes entities that perform 
critical roles in society, such that the increased costs and uncertainty of a 
bespoke framework may be justified. 
Much work needs to be done to implement bespoke bankruptcy as a 
robust complement to Code-based relief. Future work should explore 
processes that policymakers could use to coordinate actors and develop 
bespoke relief, when appropriate. Relatedly, an in-depth discussion of the 
extent to which Code-based practices should continue to dominate 
bankruptcy law in the future is likely necessary. And more research into 
bespoke bankruptcy’s possible effects on other parts of U.S. law is 
certainly needed. Although substantial work lies ahead, this Article, by 
defining bespoke bankruptcy and articulating the steps needed to assess 
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